First Draft

[Williams College]

First Draft

Before this draft, consult the text and pick out all the pages that are relevant to the discussion you are going to have. This requires that your topic be fairly constrained. Reread the passages carefully, keeping in mind the overall structure of the argument the author advances. Write down all the page numbers, and copy out a set of quotations that you think are important for the paper. You may not use all the quotations that you copy down, but it is useful to have them all in front of you for reference

Tips on quotations

[Williams College]

First Draft

Before this draft, consult the text and pick out all the pages that are relevant to the discussion you are going to have. This requires that your topic be fairly constrained. Reread the passages carefully, keeping in mind the overall structure of the argument the author advances. Write down all the page numbers, and copy out a set of quotations that you think are important for the paper. You may not use all the quotations that you copy down, but it is useful to have them all in front of you for reference

Tips on quotations

PLATO PAPER
FIRST DRAFT

Plato has Socrates reveal what justice is in an individual by applying the account of justice in the city to our soul. The basic idea seems to be that, just as every person has a place where her excellence will play a role in generating harmony in the city (433d-434d), within every individual the competing parts of our psychology will each have an appropriate role (442d and443d-444e). If the parts of our soul are ordered and in harmony, then we will be individually just.

I will argue that Plato needs an argument against the view that the macroscopic, city-level parts that must be in harmony for justice to occur are different from the microscopic, person-level parts of the soul. If I could show this, it would expose an important gap in Plato's view of justice. The argument that Plato gives that the parts of the soul are the same as the parts of the city isn't very persuasive. It seems to come at 435e.

After talking with a couple of people about Plato's argument, I came up with this thought: It is not true that every feature of a large system like a city can be found in each of the subparts of that system. It seems like sometimes the sum is not only greater but also different from the parts. Maybe features of a large system emerge only as a result of the interaction of different features of its subparts. After all, a person is made up of arms, legs, torso, etc., but we wouldn't say that, for example, courage is in someone's legs just because she is courageous. Courage looks like a different feature than the features of legs and arms and torsos. Likewise, maybe spiritedness in a city doesn't arise in spiritedness in the individuals as Socrates says in 435e. What I need is some way to say all this that is clear. Maybe I can develop that ecosystem point.

Anyway, there are several places where Plato develops his case:

Well, then, we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn't true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world, or the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians (435e).

This seems to be the heart of Plato's argument. What he is saying is that finding characteristics of a city is evidence for those same characteristics in the individuals that make up that city. He also says, "We are pretty much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual" (441c). His argument seems to be that there is no alternative explanation for the origin of those characteristics in the city. That's why he says, "Where else would they come from?" So if I can come up with another explanation, then Plato will have to take back this argument.

But does it matter? Earlier Plato writes,

...a just man won't differ at all from a just city in respect to the form of justice; rather, he'll be like the city.
He will.
But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs.
That's true.
Then, if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them (435b-c).

This goes to show that Plato thinks it is important that an individual has the same kinds of parts as the city. Maybe it is not crucial in principle because maybe the key to Plato's overall argument is harmony, whatever the parts are. But at the very least Plato would not be able to elaborate his position in the way that he does, and all the discussion of reason controlling the appetites and stuff would be based on a mistake because there might not really be a part of the soul that corresponds to 'ruler' or 'spirited guardians'. The parallel is really pressed in 441d-442.

When Socrates faces this issue head-on, what he says is strange:

...does the soul have these three parts [producers, auxiliaries, guardians] in it or not?
It doesn't look easy to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there's some truth in the old saying that everything fine is difficult.
Apparently so. But you should know, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument — although there is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer. But perhaps we can get an answer that's up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries (435c-d).

I'm not entirely sure why Socrates says this. Maybe Plato has a sense that his argument here is not adequate. Is the idea that the method of simply reflecting on what must be in a soul the problem? I guess if we are talking about real human psychologies, maybe science would have something to say. Anyway, Later Plato draws his conclusion about justice in an individual:

...Justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the varous classes within him to meddle with one another. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself... (443d).

So, again, the harmony point is central, but in order to be right about the details Plato would have to be right about the parts of the soul. Which, I claim, we have no reason to believe he is.

This thesis appears again a little later:

...Just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body.
...To produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled... (444d).

But now the metaphor has to do with health.

.
This paragraph is taken directly from the initial notes, with page references added. (This student is working from the Hackett edition but is using the scholarly notation.) .

.
This paragraph is essentially from the notes, with slight elaboration. .

.
Here is the substance of an emerging idea. At this point, the thesis can be somewhat vague. There does not need to be a structured argument. The key is that the writer has been thinking the issue over and has been talking about it with her classmates. .

.
The student has located a number of passages that discuss the identity between parts of the city and parts of the soul. For each one, she will give a couple of sentences summarizing the main point.

.

.

It pays to be scrupulous about page references at this point. A scholarly paper should give the reader ample information about the text and how to locate the discussion.

.

.

Notice that the summaries do not need to be deep or detailed. That is because not all the passages identified at this point will be used in the final paper.

.

Previous Draft Next Draft


PLATO PAPER FIRST DRAFT Plato has Socrates reveal what justice is in an individual by applying the account of justice in the city to our soul. The basic idea seems to be that, just as every person has a place where her excellence will play a role in generating harmony in the city (433d-434d), within every individual the competing parts of our psychology will each have an appropriate role (442d and443d-444e). If the parts of our soul are ordered and in harmony, then we will be individually just. I will argue that Plato needs an argument against the view that the macroscopic, city-level parts that must be in harmony for justice to occur are different from the microscopic, person-level parts of the soul. If I could show this, it would expose an important gap in Plato's view of justice. The argument that Plato gives that the parts of the soul are the same as the parts of the city isn't very persuasive. It seems to come at 435e. After talking with a couple of people about Plato's argument, I came up with this thought: It is not true that every feature of a large system like a city can be found in each of the subparts of that system. It seems like sometimes the sum is not only greater but also different from the parts. Maybe features of a large system emerge only as a result of the interaction of different features of its subparts. After all, a person is made up of arms, legs, torso, etc., but we wouldn't say that, for example, courage is in someone's legs just because she is courageous. Courage looks like a different feature than the features of legs and arms and torsos. Likewise, maybe spiritedness in a city doesn't arise in spiritedness in the individuals as Socrates says in 435e. What I need is some way to say all this that is clear. Maybe I can develop that ecosystem point. Anyway, there are several places where Plato develops his case: Well, then, we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn't true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world, or the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians (435e). This seems to be the heart of Plato's argument. What he is saying is that finding characteristics of a city is evidence for those same characteristics in the individuals that make up that city. He also says, "We are pretty much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual" (441c). His argument seems to be that there is no alternative explanation for the origin of those characteristics in the city. That's why he says, "Where else would they come from?" So if I can come up with another explanation, then Plato will have to take back this argument. But does it matter? Earlier Plato writes, ...a just man won't differ at all from a just city in respect to the form of justice; rather, he'll be like the city. He will. But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs. That's true. Then, if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them (435b-c). This goes to show that Plato thinks it is important that an individual has the same kinds of parts as the city. Maybe it is not crucial in principle because maybe the key to Plato's overall argument is harmony, whatever the parts are. But at the very least Plato would not be able to elaborate his position in the way that he does, and all the discussion of reason controlling the appetites and stuff would be based on a mistake because there might not really be a part of the soul that corresponds to 'ruler' or 'spirited guardians'. The parallel is really pressed in 441d-442. When Socrates faces this issue head-on, what he says is strange: ...does the soul have these three parts [producers, auxiliaries, guardians] in it or not? It doesn't look easy to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there's some truth in the old saying that everything fine is difficult. Apparently so. But you should know, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument — although there is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer. But perhaps we can get an answer that's up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries (435c-d). I'm not entirely sure why Socrates says this. Maybe Plato has a sense that his argument here is not adequate. Is the idea that the method of simply reflecting on what must be in a soul the problem? I guess if we are talking about real human psychologies, maybe science would have something to say. Anyway, Later Plato draws his conclusion about justice in an individual: ...Justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the varous classes within him to meddle with one another. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself... (443d). So, again, the harmony point is central, but in order to be right about the details Plato would have to be right about the parts of the soul. Which, I claim, we have no reason to believe he is. This thesis appears again a little later: ...Just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body. ...To produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled... (444d). But now the metaphor has to do with health.
	.	This paragraph is taken directly from the initial notes, with page references added. (This student is working from the Hackett edition but is using the scholarly notation.)	.

	.	This paragraph is essentially from the notes, with slight elaboration.	.

	.	Here is the substance of an emerging idea. At this point, the thesis can be somewhat vague. There does not need to be a structured argument. The key is that the writer has been thinking the issue over and has been talking about it with her classmates.	.

	.	The student has located a number of passages that discuss the identity between parts of the city and parts of the soul. For each one, she will give a couple of sentences summarizing the main point.	.

	.	It pays to be scrupulous about page references at this point. A scholarly paper should give the reader ample information about the text and how to locate the discussion.	.

	.	Notice that the summaries do not need to be deep or detailed. That is because not all the passages identified at this point will be used in the final paper.	.