THIRD PAPER — REASON

SUGGESTED TOPICS

1. When Hume distinguishes between impressions and ideas, he appeals to differences in force and vivacity. It is clear, however, that he means for impressions to correspond to perceptions that derive from the senses whereas ideas are merely copies of that which the senses deliver. We may ask, then, whether Hume is right to claim that the products of the senses will inevitably have more force and vivacity than ideas.

2. Kant claims that mathematics is synthetic a priori. Is it?

3. Kant claims that "the proposition that in all changes in the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unchanged..." is synthetic a priori. Is it?

4. Hume offers three principles of the association of ideas that comprise human chains of thought. Are these three principles (along with combinations thereof) sufficient to account for thought?

5. Is the missing shade of blue argument really a problem for Hume?

6. According to Hume, the objects of human reasoning that are relations of ideas are not dependent on what exists in the universe, and instead relies solely on the operation of thought. Is this right?

7. Kant argues that space is the necessary form of outer intuition, and that, therefore, space "represents no property whatever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in relation to each other." This certainly looks like Kant is arguing that space doesn't exist except insofar as it is a necessary condition of human experiences. But does his argument show this?

8. Stage a dialogue between Hume on Kant on the topic of whether there are synthetic a priori judgments.

9. Kant argues that time is the necessary form of inner intuition, and that, therefore, "time is not something that is self-subsistent or that attaches to things as an objective determination, and that hence would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of our intuition of it." This certainly looks like Kant is arguing that time doesn't exist except insofar as it is a necessary condition of human experiences. But does his argument show this?

10. Hume seems to argue that, if the opposite of something is conceivable, then that something is a matter of fact (rather than a relation between ideas). There are several interesting questions that arise in connection with this claim. For instance, we may ask whether our ability to conceive of something is a perfect guide as to whether that thing is possible. Second, it is possible to conceive of mathematical claims as being false (if so, Hume would be wrong about mathematics involving merely relations of ideas)? Third, couldn't it be that there are some matters of fact whose opposite we can't imagine (if so, Hume is wrong to think that imagining the opposite is a good test for whether something is a matter of fact)?

11. Is Kant's transcendental method reasonable? More specifically, Kant argues in the following way: x is a phenomenon that needs explaining, and x can only be explained by account c. Therefore, c must be right.

12. Is inductive reasoning merely a matter of custom and habit as Hume says? Or is Kant right to think that cause and effect is a synthetic a priori judgment?

13. Kant claims that necessity is a mark of a priori judgments. This suggests that we cannot have necessary a posteriori judgments. Is this right?

14. Some philosophers have argued that it is one thing to claim that space does not exist, and it is quite another to claim that time does not exist. The first, they say, is a difficult philosophical problem to grapple with, while the second is incoherent. After all, in order to make a judgment, it seems like some time must pass (i.e., the time before the judgment to the time of the judgment to the time after the judgment). Therefore, it looks like time is something that is not amenable to idealism. Defend Kant against this argument.

15. Kant offers a table of categories that, in his view, capture all of human (conceptual) understanding. Is he right to think that this table is complete? That is, is it possible to have some operation of the understanding that does not fall under his table of categories?