I. Demea proposes that one should learn the nature of the gods last (after logics, ethics, and physics), because this is the most profound, most abstruse, and demanding issue in philosophy (p. 704).

A. Philo wonders whether this might be too late, since a student might reject or neglect this issues if it is kept from her for so long.

1. Demea clarifies that he proposes postponing the use of reason to understand the nature of the gods. He still advocates 'seasoning' student's minds with piety at an early age.

B. Philo admires Demea's approach because it affords students the opportunity to note the failed pretensions of philosophy, i.e., it allows students to note that reason is frail and can come to no conclusions concerning fundamental things.

II. Cleanthes disapproves of Philo's position and points out that generating theism out of skepticism cannot ultimately work, since no one can sustain skepticism (p.705).

A. Cleanthes points out that skepticism is only sustainable over short periods of time.

1. Cleanthes points out that this truism — that we lapse into a non-philosophical condition in spite of our best efforts — can be illustrated in many different kinds of philosophy, not just skepticism.

B. Philo claims that, even though Cleanthes is right, the mind retains some of its philosophical commitments.

1. Philo claims that thinking about everyday life and thinking philosophically are usually not that different.

a. But, in the case of thinking about god, we are far removed from everyday life.

C. Cleanthes points out that, whenever there is evidence for a claim, even skeptics seem to take it seriously.

1. Furthermore, some of the domains of inquiry seem abstruse, like the nature of light (Newton) of the motion of planets (Galileo).

a. So, why, in theological questions, would skeptics claim a special failure of reason?

2. It is not even clear that skeptics can distinguish between abstruse questions and everyday ones.

D. Cleanthes points out that, if reason cannot defend theism, then it is only dogmatism and priesthood that can defend it; and that is insufficient for learned people.

PART II

I. Demea protests that the entire conversation appears to be taking atheism too seriously (p. 709).

A. Demea points out that the question is not about the being of god, but rather her nature.

1. And Demea points out that the answer to this question is unknowable to us.

a. Because we are too limited to understand the nature of god.

b. And because religious authority attests to our inability to answer this question.

B. Philo agrees with Demea that everyone believes in god, in the sense of believing in whatever is the original cause of the universe.

1. Philo agrees that we cannot know the attributes of this being.

a. Specifically, we cannot know that god is wise, thinks, designs, or has knowledge.

i. After all, these are attributes that we value as human beings, but that is no reason to think that god has them.

2. Philo points out that we don't even have to be skeptics to agree with Demea, since we have no experience at all of god's attributes.

II. Cleanthes disapproves of Philo and Demea's position, and offers the argument from design (p. 710).

A. Cleanthes points out that the universe is one great machine, subdivided into smaller machines.

1. The machines are perfectly and minutely adjusted to each other.

B. Cleanthes points out that the universe resembles (though it exceeds) human contrivances.

1. All of which are the product of design, thought, wisdom and intelligence.

C. Cleanthes points out that, where effects resemble each other, so do causes.

1. And therefore, we can infer than the cause of the universe is wise, intelligent, and has a will toward design.

III. Demea worries that Cleanthes's argument will be more vulnerable to atheist attack because it is based on experience rather than reason alone (p. 710).

IV. Philo worries that Cleanthes's argument is even worse off than most arguments based on experience (p. 710).

A. Philo points out that the reasonability of principle II.C diminishes the further the case departs from experience.

1. E.g., the inference from the circulation of blood in frogs and fishes gives some reason to think mammals have similar circulation, but much less reason to think that plants have similar circulation.

B. Philo points out that the universe is very far from the kind of effects that we usually appeal to in deploying principle II.C.

1. E.g., the inference from a house to builders as a cause is reasonable because we have encountered house builders before. (Be we have never encountered universe builders.)

V. Cleanthes claims that the fact that a house is organized and ordered is enough of a similarity with the universe to deploy principle II.C (p. 711).

VI. Philo summarizes Cleanthes's argument, then objects that one's confidence in an inference based on principle II.C must diminish as the effects vary (p. 712).

A. Philo points out that the leap from artifacts to the whole universe is the largest that can be made.

1. But that would seem to make it so that one should have the least confidence in Cleanthes's application of principle II.C.

B. Philo points out that focusing on the most limited and minute corner of the universe's achievement — namely reason — seems like prejudice and partiality.

C. Philo points out that the temporal projection of reason as a cause has not been defended.

1. After all, one would not infer that the economy of interactions in an adult animal are the same as the interactions in a fetus or sperm (animalcule).

a. This leads one to think that nature has many principles of generation. Why think reason is privileged?

D. Cleanthes points out that the same argument can be made for many conclusions of science, since the commonality that does the work in many of the claims of science have not been experienced.

1. Philo replies that we do have close analogies in science, e.g., the motion of planets as compared to the motion of earth.

PART III

I. Cleanthes presses his case by invoking an analogy with a voice in the clouds (p. 714).

A. Cleanthes images a voice that is:

1. Intelligible to all hearers.

2. Conveys useful information.

B. Cleanthes claims that the voice would certainly seem to be the product of intelligence.

C. Cleanthes points out that Philo's objections would seem to apply to this case, too.

1. Because by the loudness, extent, and flexibility of the voice, it would have to be counted as quite unlike any voice we have ever heard.

a. But none of these facts detract from the intelligence behind the voice. Therefore, something must be wrong with Philo's objections.

II. Cleanthes presses his case by comparing the universe to a library (p. 715).

A. Cleanthes points out that nature is like a book that we detect orderliness in.

1. But books have authors.

III. Cleanthes presses his case by reminding Philo and Demea of the structure of the eye (p. 715).

A. Cleanthes points out that the eye is perfectly tuned for its function.

1. Examining the eye gives every impression of a designer.

IV. Cleanthes presses his case by pointing out that complexity in an effect demands that we appreciate the complexity of the cause (p. 716).

V. Demea worries that Cleanthes's approach seems to bring god down to a human level (p. 716).

A. Demea points out that when we read a book, we apprehend the mind of the author.

B. Demea points out that human sentiments seems all tailored to addressing challenges on a human level.

1. To ascribe these to god is inappropriate because god does not face human challenges.

C. Demea points out that human ideas (i.e., the products of sense) are illusive and false.

1. To ascribe these to god is inappropriate because god is not supposed to be subject to error.

D. Demea points out that sentiment and idea exhaust the material of the human mind, so there is no basis for thinking that god's mind is composed of the same thing as our minds.

E. Demea points out that the manner of our reasoning is fleeting, uncertain, successive, and compounded.

1. To ascribe this manner of reasoning to god is inappropriate because god's reasoning is not supposed to be so limited.

F. Demea concludes that we cannot know anything about the nature of god's mind.