I. I am certain that I am a thinking thing; I therefore must know what it takes to be certain (because if I did not, how could I be certain that I am certain?)(p.357).

A. A clear and distinct impression of what I affirm is required for certainty.

1. But there are many things that I affirmed in the past which were erroneous.

a. Perceptions

i. I can be certain that these are within me.
ii. I can doubt the claim that they resembles things outside of me.

b. Mathematics

i. These claims inspire a great confidence in me.
ii. It is true that god could deceive me about math, but that requires me to positively believe that god is a deceiver. I should pursue this.

II. First, I should group my thoughts for the purpose of determining to which ones falsity and true applies (p. 358).

A. Ideas, volitions, and judgments.

1. Ideas

a. Images of things, e.g., man, sky, chimera.

b. Ideas cannot be false, they are simply in me.

2. Volitions

a. Things that stem from the will, e.g., affirming or denying.

b. Volitions cannot be false, since when something has been willfully done it cannot be true or false.

3. Judgments

a. Things that are added to the images, e.g., fear.

b. Judgments can be false.

i. The most common way for a judgment to be false is when I judge a thing to exist outside of me.

B. Ideas can be innate, adventitious, or produced by me.

1. e.g., I understand my own nature innately.

2. e.g., I judge the sun to be outside me, and it seems to be given to me from without.

a. After all, I often notice things even when I do not want to.

b. And thus I have a natural impulse to think that things are outside me.

i. But this is different from the natural light that indicates certainty, and could yet be erroneous.
ii. And, in any case, there is no reason to believe that the images are like things outside me.

3. e.g., I judge that sirens and chimeras are made by me.

C. All of these ways are inadequate to showing that there is something outside me.

III. There is another way that I may determine whether things exists outside me (p. 359).

A. There is a 'reality' distinction between my ideas (as evidenced by the wax discussion of Meditation II).

1. My ideas of substance contain more objective reality than my ideas of accidents or modes.

2. My idea of god contains more objective reality than my ideas of substance.

B. A cause must have at least as much reality as its effects.

1. E.g., something cannot come to be out of nothing, a stone could not come from something less than a stone, and heat cannot be introduced into a subject by something that has less reality than heat.

C. Therefore, if I find any idea that has more reality than I myself am able to provide, then I can be certain that there are causes other than me (and that I am not alone in the world).

1. As for corporeal things, it seems that I could be the author of those ideas.

a. Even if there are some things that are clear and distinct in my ideas of corporeal things (e.g., that they are substance), I could have borrowed that from my apprehension of myself.

2. The only thing that remains is my idea of god.

a. I understand god as a substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, and supremely powerful.

IV. It does not seem possible that the idea of god could have originated in me (p.361).

A. Although I have the idea of substance from my own case, I could not have the idea of infinite substance unless the source was something that itself has infinite substance.

1. I could not get the idea of infinite substance from the negation of finite substance because infinite substance clearly has more reality than finite substance.

a. Thus, my perception of god must be prior to myself (viz., since I perceive myself as lacking and imperfect).

2. Nor could my idea of god originate in nothing, because it has more objective reality than any other idea.

a. And it is not an objection that I cannot comprehend all of god. I only need to comprehend god's infiniteness.

3. Perhaps I am greater than I understand, and am the source of my idea of god after all.

a. That cannot be right, because the fact that my knowledge is increasing shows that I am not now infinite. But god is infinite always.

b. The kind of knowledge I have can always be increased.

c. And, in any case, the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a merely potential being.

V. If god did not exist, from where could I derive my existence (p. 362)?

A. From myself?

1. But then I would not lack for anything.

a. And it cannot be said that the things I lack are too difficult to acquire, because emerging out of nothing is most difficult of all, and — on this hypothesis — I managed that.

B. Perhaps I always existed.

1. But that would not explain my existence in time, as existing in the next moment is as difficult as originating.

a. And I observe that I do not have the power to preserve my existence over time.

C. Perhaps I was produced by some being(s) (e.g., my parents) less perfect than god.

1. The thing that created me must also be a thinking thing.

a. Either it existed always or was created by something.

i. If it existed always, it is god.
ii. If it was created by something, the same questions can be asked (and an infinite regress will not do).

D. What about the possibility that I was produced by a conspiracy of separate causes, each less than god but together enough to make me?

1. I understand god's unity as one of her perfections.

E. And, as for my parents, they did not create my nature as a thinking thing.

VI. How did I receive the idea of god (p. 363)?

A. I did not receive it from the senses, and I did not create it myself.

1. Therefore, it is innate in me.

VII. God, as a perfect being, would not deceive me (p. 363).


MEDITATION FOUR

I. If perfection makes it so that god is no deceiver, and god's works are perfect, than how is it that I am prone to error (p. 364)?

A. I am a being half-way between nothing and god.

1. So, to the extent that I participate in nothingness, I am prone to error.

B. This is not entirely satisfactory.

1. In a way that is okay, since I shouldn't presume to understand god's will.

2. And we should always keep in mind the perfection of the universe as a whole; so, the seeming imperfection of one small part may not be an imperfection after all.

II. What is the nature of my errors (p. 365)?

A. My errors derive from two simultaneous causes, my faculty of knowing and my faculty of choosing.

1. My knowing is not imperfect; it offers to me whatever it offers.

2. My choosing is not imperfect; I will whatever I will.

a. In fact, my will is as perfect as a will can be, and — in this respect — I am like god.

i. That is how I am in god's image.

b. Of course, my actual powers and imagination are very limited and in that respect I am completely unlike god.

3. Therefore, my errors derive from my will going beyond my intellect.