BERKELEY — THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS
THE THIRD DIALOGUE CONTINUED


XIII. Hylas wonders whether the mind is extended or unextended. (He is setting up a question concerning how ideas can be in an unextended mind.) (p. 618).

A. Philonous denies that he means 'in' in a literal sense.

1. Instead, he means 'comprehends' or 'perceives'.

B. Hylas claims that this shows that Philonous is misusing words.

1. Philonous claims that his use of 'in' is not a misuse. He claims that — in describing mental operations — it is common to borrow words for describing the relations between sensible things.

XIV. Hylas claims that Philonous's doctrine is inconsistent with scripture (and he views this incompatibility as a very serious issue) (p. 82).

A. Philonous points out that Moses mentions many sensible things, but does not make the further claim that they have an absolute external existence or are "solid corporeal substances".

1. Philonous claims that Hylas could only disallow the possibility that Moses is talking about ideas if Hylas misunderstands Philonous's claim as the claim that things are illusory. Philonous denies that things are illusory.

B. Hylas insists that there is a manifest incompatibility between the book of genesis and Philonous's view.

1. Philonous insists that there is no incompatibility, i.e., that his doctrine can explain all the details of the book of genesis. Namely:

a. At creation, we would perceive things produced by god in the order they were produced as ideas.

i. Note that they would not really be 'new', as god apprehended them throughout eternity. They would simply be new to us.

b. Hylas points out that this would render it impossible for inanimate things to be created before humankind, which is in contradiction with the book of genesis.

i. Philonous replies that this is to assume that there were no other (non-human) minds.
ii. Philonous replies that another possibility is that things were created in the sense of god having made it so that they would be perceived if anyone was there to perceive them (even if no one but god herself was there yet).

c. Hylas points out that there is a problem with things being created in time, since god is eternal. If god is eternal, and everything (with the exception of her mind and our minds) is in the mind of god, then it would seem that Philonous's view entails that everything is eternal.

i. Philonous again replies that existence is relative to the ability of perceivers like us to apprehend a thing. God's creating a thing is with respect to our disposition to perceive that thing.

d. Hylas points out that god's decision to allow us to perceive a thing must be timeless and eternal, otherwise it would be new to god (i.e., something that she did not know beforehand). The implication is that it is difficult to reconcile temporality with god.

i. Philonous points out that this puzzle tells equally against his doctrine and against the doctrine of material substance.

C. Hylas cannot shake the feeling that there is still an incompatibility between scripture and Philonous's doctrine.

1. Philonous (somewhat exasperated) points out that his views allow a distinction between the ectypal and archetypal.

2. Philonous points out that, if Hylas has general concerns about creation, then they will be concerns about creation of material substance, too.

3. Philonous points out that, however Hylas found creation intelligible before their dialogues (if he did), he still has those resources (with the exception of the useless material substance postulate).

D. Hylas hesitates.

1. Philonous claims that Hylas is not dealing fairly if he cannot articulate reasons for his hesitation.

2. Philonous points out that his doctrine maintains all of common sense, since it maintains all the things that Moses talks about.

a. Philonous claims that, moreover, the thesis that matter exists denies an important interpretation of scripture, namely that creation is involved in the sustenance of all things.

b. Philonous claims that, moreover, the thesis that matter exists has emboldened atheists through the ages.

XV. Philonous summarizes the positive elements of his case (p. 622).

A. We are furnished with a proof of god.

1. Not merely as an obscure cause, but in the strict and proper sense of god.

B. Science is freed from irritating metaphysical speculations.

1. The puzzle of life is explained.

C. Morality is put on firm foundations.

D. Metaphysics is shown to be silly.

E. Mathematics is made intelligible.

F. Skepticism is avoided.

1. Philonous reminds Hylas that he agreed that the person who ended up the greater skeptic would be rejected.

XVI. Hylas points out that he cannot be sure that he will not change his mind later.

A. Philonous points out that that is always the case with conclusions we draw.

B. Philonous gives Hylas some resources for considering these questions in the future.

1. If there is a difficulty for Philonous's doctrine, check to see if matter solves the difficulty. If not, then the difficulty is not telling against Philonous.

2. Check to see if the difficulty arises from the nonexistence of matter. If not, then the difficulty is not telling against Philonous.

3. Avoid presupposing the existence of matter. Matter is sometimes presupposed in arguing that matter is not is refuted by immaterialism.

4. Most of all, do not mistake Philonous's doctrine as the denial of sensible things.

XVII. H&P's dialogue concludes.

A. Hylas confesses that it seems as if he often mistook the question they were discussing.

B. Hylas suggests that the word 'matter' be retained, for public relations purposes.

1. Philonous accepts this suggestion, as long as material substance is not attributed to matter.

a. Philonous points out that matter is a technical term, invented by philosophers, so it will probably not be missed.

i. Philonous urges that 'matter' not be used in philosophy, lest it encourage atheists.

C. Hylas still wants to retain 'matter'.

1. Philonous claims that he has always been a champion of common sense against philosophy.

2. Hylas adds that Philonous is an enemy of skepticism.