A. Philonous reminds him that he perceives matter either immediately or mediately.

1. If immediately, then Hylas has to say what senses he uses to perceive matter.

2. If mediately, then Hylas has to give reasons for inferring matter from the things he immediately perceives.

B. Philonous wonders whether it could make a difference to what Hylas senses if matter exits. If not, then why beleive in it?

VI. Hylas claims to believe in matter as something unknown and distinct from everything that he has been talking about (p. 605).

A. Philonous asks where this matter is suposed to exist.

1. If it exists in a place, then it is located in space, and space is in the mind.

2. Hylas claims that he does not know, but that he is not ashamed to not know.

B. Philonous asks after the manner of the existence of matter.

1. Hylas says that matter neither thinks, nor acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived.

a. Philonous accuses Hylas of not having any positive theory of matter at all.

2. Hylas is again not ashamed to not know of the nature of matter.

VII. Hylas points out that Philonous does not have an argument against the existence of matter (p. 605).

A. Philonous (again) responds that:

1. It is sometimes reasonable to infer things from immediate perceptions.

2. It is not reasonable to infer a thing from immediate perceptions when:

a. There are no good arguments in its favor.

b. We have no relative notion of the thing.

c. An abstraction from perceptions and minds is being made.

d. We have no idea at all what we are talking about.

B. Hylas says that he still cannot get rid of his belief in matter.

1. Philonous (again) challenges Hylas to say what thing in nature requires matter to explain it.

a. Hylas says that the reality of sensible things cannot be maintained without matter.

b. Philonous insists that perceiving a thing is enough to secure its reality.

VIII. Hylas points out that, for all that Philonous has said, matter is still possible (p. 606).

A. Philonous denies that matter is possible in the sense of being an "extended, solid, moveable substance distinct from the mind."

B. Hylas points out that matter is still possible in some other sense.

1. Philonous challenges Hylas to say how anything can be shown to be impossible except by refuting a received definition of a thing. Philonous maintains that he has refutted the possibility of matter in the received sense.

C. Hylas maintains that matter in the most abstracted and indefinite sense is still possible.

1. Philonous challenges Hylas to say how this can be shown impossible.

a. Hylas says that an impossibility will be shown if a contradiction is revealed.

b. Philonous points out that contradictions can only be revealed when someone has a positive view of something, and Hylas does not have a positive view.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE


I. Hylas doubts the possibility of knowledge in general and Philonous resists (p. 607).

A. Philonous claims that he knows many mundane things.

1. Hylas claims that Philonous knows none of those things, he only has an appearance in his mind.

B. Philonous claims that he can distinguish many things.

1. Hylas claims that Philonous can only distinguish between his own ideas.

C. Philonous points out that people get around in the world just fine.

1. Hylas claims that being successful in the world does not require any speculative sophistication and that people are mistaken but they don not know it.

D. Philonous points out that is Hylas's belief in material substance that makes him offer these unnatural and extravagant skeptical claims.

1. Hylas agrees, but says that Philonous's views are just as amenable to refutation.

2. Philonous says that he does not have any speculative hypotheses about things. He just believes what common sense tells him.

II. Hylas wonders whether anything would exist if Philonous's mind was annhiliated (p. 609).

A. Philonous does not think that sensible things depend on his mind. His position is that sensible things depend on there being a mind.

1. Philonous repeats his proof for the existence of god.

III. Hylas challenges Philonous' confidence in god (p. 609).

A. Hylas points out that, if ideas are inert, that they cannot be of an active thing like god.

1. Since Philonous thus cannot have an idea of god, how can it be possible that sensible things exist in the mind of god.

a. Philonous says he does not have an idea of god (or any other spirit or mind) but he has a notion of god.

i. Philonous knows his own mind immediately or intuitively but not by perception.
ii. Philonous's notion of god is obtained by reflecting on his own mind, and increasing its capacities.
iii. And, in any case, Philonous is driven to god by reflection.

2. If Philonous does not need an idea of god to conceive of god, then why can't Hylas conceive of matter without an idea of matter?

a. Philonous claims that matter is not known.

i. Immediately by the senses.
ii. Mediately, on the basis of sensible things.
iii. By extending knowledge of oneself.

B. Hylas presses Philonous on his knowledge of minds.

1. Philonous repeats his reasoning.

IV. Hylas points out that, by Philonous's view, he has no identity. Rather he is merely a "system of floating ideas" (p 610).

A. Philonous insists that he is conscious of his own being as different from his ideas.

1. Philonous argues that he has an immediate sense of his own unity, as the subject of, e.g., both colors and sounds.

IV. H&P discuss the difference between fantasy and reality (p. 611).

A. Philonous claims (again) that fantasy is

1. Dim.
2. Irregular.
3. Confused.
4. Unconnected.

V. Hylas points out that, if Philonous is right, then god is the origin of evil things (p. 612).

A. Philonous points out that that is the case on Hylas's view, too, since god would be committing evil through the instrument of matter.

B. Philonous points out that evil is not in the act, but in the intention. Therefore, the idea of evil act that we sense is not itself evil. The mind behind it is evil.

C. Philonous points out that he does not think god the sole author of ideas. Human minds, with their freedom, can 'create' ideas through their will by acting in the world.

VI. Hylas points out that, if Philonous is right, then illusions are unintelligible (p. 612).

A. Philonous accounts for illusions by claiming that people are right in their immediate perception, but are sometimes wrong in the inference they make.

1. E.g., the bent stick in the water is really bent. The error is in thinking that it will stay bent when it is removed from the water.

2. E.g., the moon really is flat and one foot in diameter. The error is in thinking that it will stay that way when we move closer to it.

VII. Hylas claims that their dispute is wholly semantic (p. 613).

A. Hylas says that they are talking about the same thing, but Philonous calls it 'spirit' while Hylas calls it 'matter.'

1. Philonous insists that spirit is

a. Active.

b. Unextended.

2. And Philonous insists that matter is neither of these things.

B. Hylas claims that there might be something of a 'third nature' distinct from matter and spirit.

1. Philonous claims that that third nature would have to be so much like spirit that it simply is spirit.

VIII. Hylas points out that, if Philonous is right, then god feels pain (which is an imperfection) (p. 613).

A. Philonous claims that god has no body and does not experience ideas through senses.

1. Therefore, god knows pain but does not feel it.

IX. Hylas claims that Philonous' view is contrary to physics (p. 614).

A. Philonous points out that Hylas is begging the question by invoking matter to explain matter.

X. Hylas points out that, if Philonous is right, then god has been deceiving humankind, which is inconsistent with her goodness (p. 615).

A. Philonous claims that the fact that god allows us to discover things does not imply that she deceives us before we discover them.

XI. Hylas wonders why diverse senses do not reveal a singular thing (p616).

A. Philonous claims that, strictly speaking, we do not see the same thing that we feel.

1. Instead, we group together things in ways that are successful.

XII. Hylas wonders how, on Philonous's view, many people can perceive the same thing (p. 617).

A. Philonous points out that that is only a problem on a technical definition of 'same.'