XII. Hylas protests that he sees things at a distance (p. 594).

A. Philonous points out that we see things at a distance in dreams, but we do not thereby think that the objects in dreams are distant.

1. Hylas claims that this is a case of deception.

2. Philonous rejects the claim that there is deception in this case. Neither the senses nor reason allege that the objects exists without the mind.

B. Hylas continues to maintain that sight itself suggests outness or distance.

1. Philonous points out that sight does not tell us anything at all about singular objects at a distance. This is because the ideas of sight change as we get closer to an object.

a. We associate sequences of ideas with one another as we get closer to a thing.

b. We associate the passage of time with the change of ideas.

C. Philonous reminds Hylas that he does not think colors exists without the mind, even though they appear at a distance, too.

XIII. Hylas distinguishes ideas and objects (and is embarrassed he had not thought of the distinction before) (p.595).

A. Hylas claims that objects are perceived by sense, but not immediately.

1. Julius Caesar statue analogy.

a. Philonous points out that the statue case relies on reason and memory.

i. Someone who had never known of Caesar would have the same idea of the statue as Hylas.
ii. Therefore, in Hylas it is reason and memory that are drawing the connection between the statue and Caesar.
iii. Therefore, this example does not show that something perceived by sense is not immediately perceived. Instead, it shows that the statue suggests to the mind other ideas "which are accustomed to be connected."

b. Philonous points out that the statue case only works when the idea from the statue can be connected with other ideas grounded in former perception.

B. Hylas cannot offer a recollection of material objects nor a good reason for them, but he claims there is no reason against them either.

1. Philonous mocks Hylas for believing in things on the thin grounds that there is no reason not to believe in them.

a. "The proof should lie with him who holds the affirmative."

XIV. Hylas maintains that ideas are like external things (p. 597).

A. Philonous wonders whether the external things have a stable, permanent nature.

1. Philonous points out that sensations do not have a stable permanent nature, so it is hard to see how ideas are like external things.

B. Philonous points out that, on Hylas' view, external things are insensible.

1. Philonous is puzzled as to how something that is sensible can resemble something that is insensible. It seems as if there is no respect in which the two things can resemble one another.

a. Hylas agrees.

i. Philonous concludes that it is Hylas who is the skeptic, since, on Hylas's principles, one must deny the real existence of things.

THE SECOND DIALOGUE

I. Hylas (with renewed energy) claims that the modern way of explaining things is seductive. Specifically, he finds attractive the thesis that brains and the central nervous system mediate the perception of external objects (p. 598).

A. Philonous wonders whether Hylas means a sensible thing when he talks about 'brain'.

1. Hylas does mean a sensible thing.

a. Philonous wonders how the brain idea can cause all the other ideas.

i. Philonous wonders what idea caused the brain idea.

2. Hylas claims that the brain that causes ideas is not the sensible idea brain, but another one that he imagines.

a. Philonous points out that his imaginary brain is still an idea of a brain, so the problem has not been solved.

i. "All that we know or conceive are our own ideas."

3. Philonous points out that the brain explanation was never that promising anyway, because a motion in the nerves cannot explain consciousness.

II. Philonous offers his soliloquy against skepticism (p. 599).

A. Hylas takes solace in the fact that he is not alone in being a skeptic, since Philonous is one, too.

B. Philonous denies being a skeptic, since he never defined reality in terms of external objects.

III. Philonous offers his novel proof for the existence of god (p. 600).

A. Proof

1.Sensible things can only exist in mind.
2. Sensible things do not depend on Philonous' mind.
3. Therefore, there must be some other mind on which some sensible things depend.

B. This proof reverses the usual order of things in that it starts with sensible things and arrives at god, rather than merely claiming that god apprehends all things.

C. Philonous distinguishes his conception of god from Malebranche's.

D. Philonous distinguishes between fantasy and real things.

1. Fantasy.

a. Not distinct.
b. Not strong.
c. Not vivid.
d. Not permanent.

IV. Hylas wonders whether there might be something other than minds and ideas, namely matter (p. 601).

A. Philonous repeats that matter would have to be unintelligible by sense.

B. Philonous challenges Hylas to give his reasons for believing in matter.

1. Hylas points out that he is not the cause of his ideas.

a. Hylas declares that by 'matter' he will mean whatever causes his ideas.

i. Philonous objects to this suggestion because it amounts to an arbitrary change of the meaning of words.
ii. Philonous maintains that 'matter' means "an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive substance."

b. Hylas declares that matter is the instrument in the production of ideas.

i. Philonous points out that Hylas knows nothing of the construction of this instrument.
ii. Philonous wonders what reason Hylas could have for believing in this instrument.
iii. Hylas wonders what reason Hylas has against it.
iv. Philonous claims that, if there is no reason to believe something, that is sufficient reason not to believe.

c. Hylas protests that he does have an idea of instrument in general.

i. Philonous does not see how this is different from cause.
ii. Philonous points out that god wouldn't require instruments.

d. Hylas declares that matter is the occasion of ideas.

i. Philonous challenges Hylas on the nature of the occasions, and Hylas confesses he has no knowledge of their nature.
ii. Philonous challenges Hylas to produce reasons for believing in occasions, and Hylas points to the regularity of events as something in need of explanation.