INTRODUCTION — IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

I — ON LOGIC AS SUCH

I. Cognition arises from two basic sources (p. 193).

A. Our receptivity for presentations (call this ability sensibility).

1. An object is given to us through receptivity.

a. Can be pure or empirical.

i. Is pure if it contains only the form under which things are intuited.
ii. Is empirical if it contains sensation.

2. The science of the rules of sensibility is aesthetic (see previous lecture).

B. Our spontaneity of concepts (call this ability understanding).

1. An object is thought in relation to that which is given.

a. Can be pure or empirical

i. Is pure if it contains solely the form of thought of an object.
ii. Is empirical if it contains sensation.

2. The science of the rules of understanding is logic.

C. Intuition and concepts exhaustively comprise cognition.

D. Intuition and concepts cannot exchange their functions.

II. Logic can be done either in terms of its general use or its special use (p. 194).

A. Logic of understanding's general use:

1. Contains absolutely necessary rules of thought without which understanding would not be possible.

2. Is neutral with respect to the objects of understanding.

3. Can be pure or applied.

a. Is pure if it abstracts away from all empirical conditions under which we exercise understanding.

b. Is applied if it includes the conditions of our psychology.

B. Logic of understanding's special use:

1. Contains rules for thinking about certain kinds of objects (e.g., as in the sciences).

II — ON TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

I. There is a distinction in general logic between pure and empirical thought of objects (p. 195-6).

A. In a general logic that only includes pure thought of objects, there would be absolutely no empirical component.

B. In a general logic that allows empirical thought of objects, some empirical component would be present.

III — ON THE DIVISION OF GENERAL LOGIC INTO ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC

I. General logic analyzes all elements of understanding into its elements; these elements govern all logical judging in our thinking (p. 197).

A. An analytic of this sort sets the complete criterion for truth.

1. Any criterion for truth that deals in agreement with cognition and its object will be incoherent.

a. Argument: A universal criterion of truth would have to be adequate for any cognition, but, by the proposal above, truth consists in a specific agreement between a particular cognition and particular object. Therefore, the proposal cannot offer a criterion of truth.

2. If an analytic is contradicted, then thought is in conflict with itself and must be false.

a. But a logic cannot go any further than providing this negative criterion for truth.

B. Dialectic general logic (on the other hand) tries to derive truths from general logic itself.

1. This is very tempting, but fails because general logic cannot ever teach us anything about objects.

2. Therefore, Kant will treat dialectic general logic as illusory.

IV — ON THE DIVISION OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC INTO TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC

I. Transcendental logic can be divided into analytic and dialectic (p. 199).

A. An analytic transcendental logic sets forth the elements of pure understanding.

1. It is the logic of truth because no cognition can contradict it.

B. Dialectic transcendental logic tries to derive truths from the operation of understanding itself.

1. But is doomed to fail, as transcendental logic can never deliver truths about objects.

2. Therefore, Kant will treat dialectic transcendental logic as illusory.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

DIVISION I — TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

I. (By way of reminder) Transcendental analytic consists of the dissection of understanding into all of its pure elements (p. 201).

A. Keep in mind:

1. The concepts must be pure rather than empirical.

2. The concepts must not belong to intuition.

3. The concepts must be elementary.

4. The table of these concepts must be complete.

B. One cannot arrive at a complete table of these concepts by simply enumerating them one after another. Instead, one must have an idea of the whole of the a priori understanding of cognition.

BOOK I — ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

CHAPTER I — ON THE GUIDE FOR THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

TRANSCENDENTAL GUIDE FOR THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

SECTION I — ON THE UNDERSTANDING'S LOGICAL USE AS SUCH

I. Apart from intuition, there is only one way of understanding: through concepts (p. 204).

A. Concepts rest on function, i.e., on arranging various presentations under one common presentation.

B. The use that understanding makes of concepts is to judge by means of them.

1. This judgment is always indirect, because a concept is not an intuition and must instead pass through that which is given by intuition.

C. Understanding can be reduced to these judgments, and thus may be called a power of judgment.

D. We can find all the functions of the understanding if we can illuminate all the functions of unity in judgments.

SECTION II — §9

I. When we abstract from all contents and pay attention to the form of understanding, judgments can be understood under four headings each of which contains three moments (p. 206).

A. The division expressed by the table of judgments, above, departs slightly from that given by logicians.

1. Singular judgments are treated in logic as equivalent to universal judgments that range over a single object. But for Kant's purposes, singular judgments do express a unity that is not captured by universal judgments.

2. Similarly, infinite judgments are logically equivalent to affirmative or negative judgments, but Kant wants to emphasize that they have a different presentation than affirmative or negative judgments (e.g., there is a difference between saying that the soul is not mortal and that the soul is non-mortal).

3. There are three relations expressed in the table of judgments

a. Predicate to subject (e.g., This apple is red).

b. Ground to consequence or, the first part of a hypothetical to its consequence (e.g., If x, then y).

c. The relations of the members of a divided cognition (e.g., Either x or y).

4. Modality concerns the value of a copula in reference to a though as either

a. Possible

b. Actual

c. Necessary

B. Some examples

1. All apples are red (Universal, Affirmative, Categorical, Assertoric)

2. Some apples are red (Particular, Affirmative, Categorical, Assertoric)

3. This apple is this apple (Singular, Affirmative, Categorical, Apodeictic)

4. Necessarily, all apples are red (Universal, Affirmative, Categorical, Apodeictic)

5. If all apples are red, then apple farmers farm red things (Universal, Affirmative, Hypothetical, Assertoric)

6. Necessarily, If all apples are red, then no apple farmers farm non-red things (Universal, Negative, Hypothetical, Apodeictic)

7. Possibly, some apples are not red (Particular, Negative, Categorical, Problematic)

SECTION III — §10

I. While general logic abstracts from all content in cognitions, transcendental logic has before it the elements offered by transcendental aesthetic (p. 210).

A. The manifold offered by transcendental aesthetic must be combined. Call this synthesis.

1. Synthesis is putting several presentations into one.

B. When a synthesis (derived from intuition) has concepts applied to it a priori, there are as many possibilities as in the case of pure judgment. (Call the functions of applying these concepts categories.) Thus, we arrive at a table of categories: