§1

I. Intuition versus Sensibility (p. 774).

A. Intuition is the capacity for cognition to refer to objects directly (contrast this with mere sensation).

1. Intuition requires that an object be given to us, i.e., it requires that an object affect us.

B. Sensibility is the capacity for cognition to be affected.

1. Thus, we may say that sensibility gives us intuitions.

III. Matter versus Form (p. 774).

A. Matter is whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation.

1. Matter is given to us a posteriori.

B. Form is when the manifold of the appearance can be ordered in certain relations (where 'manifold' means subparts).

1. Form must be the sort of thing that can be studied apart from all sensation.

a. Argument: That which can order sensations cannot itself be a sensation.

IV. The pure form of sensible intuitions (called pure intuitions) is found in the mind a priori (p. 774).

A. There must, therefore, be a science of all principles of a priori sensibility, and this science will be called transcendental aesthetic.

1. This is to be contrasted with the principles of pure thought, which will be called transcendental logic.

V. By isolating sensibility and by segregating from sensibility everything that belongs to sensation (i.e., the matter of sensation), we will discover that there are two forms of sensible intuition (p. 775).

A. Space

B. Time

SECTION I — SPACE

§2, METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THIS CONCEPT (An exposition is metaphysical if it shows what is given a priori in a concept)

I. By means of outer sense, we present all objects in space and as having spatial properties like shape, magnitude, and relation to one another (p. 775).

A. Space is not an empirical concept.

1. In order for any sensations to be thought of as non-identical (spatially) with oneself, space is a precondition.

2. In order for sensation to exhibit relations between one another, they must be presented as different.

a. Sensations are presented as outside one another.

b. Sensations are presented as alongside one another.

B. We can never have a presentation of there being no space.

1. Though we can think of space as empty of objects.

2. Therefore, space must be a precondition for the possibility of experience, and not dependent on experience.

C. Space is not a universal concept under which we conceive of things.

1. Firstly, there is only one space, so it is not the case that we are conceiving of things as individually spatial.

2. Secondly, there cannot be parts of space out of which we compose singular space, since those parts would have to be in space.

a. Therefore, an a priori intuition of space underlies all concepts of space.

D. We think space as simultaneous and infinite.

1. So, even though cases of particular concepts of things as spatial will be individual, space itself is not.

a. This is additional proof that space is an a priori intuition.

§3 — THE TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE (An exposition is transcendental if it shows how synthetic a priori judgments follow from it)

I. Geometry delivers synthetic a priori judgments and from that we can understand space (p. 776).

A. How is this possible?

1. This intuition (space) resides merely in the subject, "as the subject's formal character of being affected by objects..." (p. 776). In other words, we could only get the necessity of geometrical inference if the complete truth of the inference was due to the operation of our intuition. Nothing else will guarantee it.

a. This account enables us to understand the possibility of geometry as delivering apodeictic principles (that is, principles that carry with them the consciousness of their necessity).

II. Conclusions (p. 776).

A. Space is not a property of things in themselves.

B. Space is the form of appearances of outer sense.

1. It is a subjective condition under which it is possible for us to have outer intuition.

C. We can only speak of space from the human standpoint.

1. Hence we cannot say that space encompasses all things in themselves.

a. Because we cannot make judgments about the intuitions of other thinking beings.

D. Arguments for the ideality of space based on colors or taste (e.g., Berkeley's arguments) will not yield space as a priori.

1. This is because these are merely changes in ourselves as subjects that may differ between people.

SECTION II — TIME

§4 — THE METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME

I. By means of inner sense, we represent all objects in time (p. 775, 778).

A. Time is not an empirical concept.

1. Simultaneity and succession could not enter our perception if it was not already present.

B. Time underlies all presentations.

1. We can remove appearances from time, but we cannot get rid of time itself.

C. Time is the basis for apodeictic principles having to do with time.

1. But time itself is sequential.

D. Time is not a universal concept under which presentations are conceived of as sequential.

1. Different times are part of one and the same time.

E. Saying that time is infinite is the same as saying that any given magnitude of time must 'fit' within an underlying time, therefore the underlying time must be unlimited.

§5 — TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME

I. The concepts of change and motion are only possible through and in the presentation of time (p. 778).

§6 — CONCLUSION FROM THESE CONCEPTS

I. Time is not objective (p. 778).

A. If time were something, it would be actual without being an actual object (p. 779).

B. If time was an ordering of things in themselves (as, perhaps, Berkeley thought), then it could not precede the objects as their condition (p. 779).

II. Time is the form of inner sense because it determines the relations of presentations in our inner state (p. 779).

III. Time is indirectly a condition of outer experiences (p. 779).

IV. Time is empirically real, but does not have a claim to absolute reality (p. 779).