I. Cleanthes worries that Demea's 'mystical' position makes theism completely empty since 'god' is only a word with no content at all (p. 717).

A. Cleanthes points out that, if Demea is right, theism is not different from atheism since there is no content to make the difference.

II. Demea maintains that Cleanthes's view is at odds with theism (p. 717).

A. Demea points out that, if god thinks in the manner we do, then god's thoughts occur in some order or other, with new ideas occurring all the time.

1. But that is incompatible with god's immutability (which implies no succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution).

B. Cleanthes bites the bullet and claims that people who maintain that god is immutable are mystics.

1. Cleanthes says that we should never attribute to god characteristics that are incompatible with her intelligence.

a. Because intelligence is required for reason, thought, will, sentiment, love, etc.

C. Philo points out that Cleanthes is essentially claiming that all christians are mystics.

III. Philo presses the case against anthropomorphizing god by claiming that plans needs a cause as much as the ordering of matter does (p. 718).

A. Philo points out that an ordered mental world (i.e., the mind of a designer) needs a cause as much as the ordered world.

1. Experience tells us that minds and matter are the same with respect to being ordered and with respect to needing causes.

a. Our own mind is an instance of mind in general.

i. Our own thinking seems to have a cause, because different people in different conditions think different things.

b. Animal and plant bodies comprise an instance of matter in general.

B. Philo claims that there is a vicious regress if we attempt to explain the orderliness of god's plan be appealing to the plan of some other god.

C. Philo claims that there is no sense in claiming that god's mind has an order independently of any cause, because one could seemingly make the same claim for the universe.

1. Philo points out that we have experience with matter with no known cause (indeed that is most of our experiences).

2. Philo points out that we have experience with mind that have no order, e.g., madness.

3. Philo concludes that there is no more reason to think that order is intrinsic to mind than it is to matter.

IV. Cleanthes replies to Philo by claiming that ultimate causes are beyond their inquiry (p. 719).

A. Cleanthes reminds Philo that his argument is not based on the need for a first cause.

1. Rather, it is based on the need for a designer.

PART V

I.Philo presses the case against anthropomorphizing god by claiming that Cleanthes's central principle — like effects prove like causes — yields disastrous consequences (p. 719).

A. Philo points out that this principle renounces infinity as one of god's attributes.

1. Because the cause must be proportioned to the effect, and we only experience finitude.

B. Philo points out that this principle renounces perfection as one of god's attributes.

1. Because the cause must be proportioned to the effect, and we have no experience of perfection or imperfection (this is the only world we have).

a. Even if the world was perfect, we would have no reason to attribute this to the designer.

i. Compare with a shipbuilder and ship. The shipbuilder may be a completely stupid copycat of someone else's designs.

C. Philo points out that this principle renounces unity as one of god's attributes.

1. Because unity or disunity are equally compatible with our experiences.

a. Occam's razor is no help here, because we are talking about attributes, not entities, and the entities have not yet been demonstrated.

i. e.g., When a scale is balanced, we know that the counterweight has an equal weight. But we don't know if this is achieved through a single counterweight or an aggregate of them.

D. Philo points out that one has to attribute all the properties of the cause, not just some.

1. Therefore, since designers are the product of procreation, so is god.

2. Therefore, god must have a body and shape.

E. Cleanthes take solace in the fact that all of Philo's points grant that there is a designer, and that that is enough of a basis for religion.

PART VI

I.Demea claims that it is a very slight foundation that Cleanthes has to work with (p. 722).

II. Philo introduces a principle of reasoning that is closely related to Cleanthes's principle, and claims that there are many unfortunate consequences from this principle, too. Philo's principle is, where several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will be found to be similar (p. 722).

A. Philo points out that the universe seems be like an animal in its ecology and balance.

1. Thus, Philo concludes that the universe has a soul and that god is it.

a. This is a thesis than many ancient religions maintained.

b. This is a thesis that is truer to our experience than the claim that the universe is a house or a machine.

c. This is a thesis that is consistent with the concomitance of mind and body.

B. Cleanthes resists the analogy

1. The universe does not have organs of sense.

2. The universe does not have reason.

3. In short, the universe seems more like a plant than an animal.

PART VII

I. Philo claims that, if the universe bears a greater resemblance to a plant than a machine, then the cause must resemble the causes of plants, namely vegetation (used as a verb) (p. 724).