Contemporary Epistemology

Philosophy 331, Autumn 2005

Mondays 7pm-9:30pm..|..Harper House Seminar Room

Joe Cruz, Assistant Professor of Philosophy

Epistemology is one of the core areas of philosophical reflection. In this course, we will study the literature in analytic philosophy on the nature of knowledge and rational belief. Epistemologists seek answers to the following kinds of questions:

    – When is it rational to have a particular belief?
    – What is knowledge (as opposed to opinion)?
    – In order to be justified in holding a belief, must someone know (or believe) that she is justified in holding
    that belief?
    – What, if anything, justifies our scientific knowledge?

These questions are typically asked within a framework where the overarching goal is attaining truth and avoiding falsity. Beyond this common ground, however, epistemologists are much divided. Some maintain that these issues are solely the province of philosophy, using traditional methods of a priori analysis and intuition about cases. Others maintain that these questions will only yield to methods that incorporate our broader insight into the structure of the world including, perhaps, science or feminist thought. Both stances face severe difficulties. Further, even where there is agreement as to the proper way of answering epistemological questions, there is a stunning variety of possible answers to each question.

 

REQUIRED READINGS

Required readings are in electronic form and can be accessed in two ways. First, you will find links below in the schedule of assignments to PDF files. In most cases the links require you to be on a campus computer. Second, all of the readings will be placed on Blackboard.

I will assume that each of you has reliable and convenient internet access. If this is not the case, please see me for printouts of the electronic texts.

 

GRADING

    Grading on all writing assignments will be anonymous. Please turn in your papers with only your Williams ID number on it in some unobtrusive place.

Anonymous grading is one way of assuring that the collegiality of our interactions does not cloud my assessment of your work. Grading blindly is not a perfect mechanism for this purpose. One crucial disadvantage to anonymous grading is that the instructor will not know when your work is systematically inadequate and will not approach you with concerns about your writing. As a result, there is an additional burden of maturity and responsibility on your shoulders. You must elect to visit office hours, to discuss your work with the teaching assistant, and to seek out informal opportunities to improve your writing.

The desire to preserve the integrity of the anonymous grading system should never prevent you from seeking advice on assignments for this course. You are encouraged to speak with me with your work in hand. Naturally this will reveal facts of authorship, and may give the instructor some insight into your style and interests. Still, your success in meeting the challenges of this course should always be our first concern

 

    1. Participation

      Discussion is essential to the vitality of the seminar. Your first priority is reading the assignments carefully and working diligently on the writing for the course. Thoughtful, honest, and respectful participation derives from these. Every effort will be made to ensure that the class is a welcoming forum for sharing serious ideas. In addition, participation is more inclusive than many students realize. Being attentive and engaged in class, asking clarificatory questions, and discussing aspects of the course with the instructor during office hours all fall under this heading. Advanced students typically need not worry about this element of their performance, but the instructor reserves the privilege of treating participation as constituting up to 10% of the final grade.

 

    2. Weekly papers

      You are required to write 10 short papers. These assignments are intended to stimulate class discussion and to help you master the material.

      There are 12 weeks in the course. Thus, you may skip 2 of these weeks over the span of the semester in order to complete work for other courses or for personal reasons. If you elect to write more than 10 weekly papers, the 10 best will be used to calculate the final grade for this component of the course.

      For the first half of the semester I will recommend topics that you may write on, but at any point you may choose any element of the week's reading to engage. For example, you may briefly summarize the epistemological issues of the reading and critically respond by using other material from the course. Or, you may pick a direct quotation from the readings and attempt to show that the ideas contained in it are misguided or fail to take into consideration important factors. Note that your responses need not be negative. You may take these papers as an opportunity to sympathetically review or to elaborate on proposals made in the literature.

      About 2 pages (3 page maximum). Typewritten, double spaced in a 12 point font. No title page. 60% of final grade with each paper weighted equally.

 

    3. Final paper

      The final paper may be an extension of a weekly paper or may advance completely new ideas. This will be an opportunity for extended discussion of any topic in the course. You are not required to seek additional sources for final papers, though you may. The further reading for the course section, below, is a reasonable place to begin.

      Papers must reflect original thoughts and ideas. Any direct quotations or paraphrased material from outside sources must be credited and footnoted in your favorite style. Violation of this constitutes plagiarism. If you have questions about how the honor code applies to written work, please do not hesitate to contact me.

      12-15 pages. Typewritten, double spaced in a 12 point font. No title page. 30% of final grade. Essays are due on the third-to-last day of the exam period (the latest time the Dean's office allows written work to be turned in).



SEMINAR RESOURCES

    Office hours - The instructor holds office meetings each week in Harper 9. They are:
    Mondays 4pm-5:30pm
    Tuesdays 1pm-3pm
    Thursdays 1pm-3pm

    Additional times are available by special arrangement. Students are welcome to visit individually or in groups.

    Instant Messaging - The instructor will occassionally be available via AIM. You may check anytime, and you may assumes that if I am logged on, I am available (and eager) for conversation. My screen name is professorjcruz.

    Optional reading list - You will find a bibliography of further reading for the course after the schedule of topics of readings.

    Students with disabilities who may need disability-related classroom accommodations for this course are encouraged to set up an appointment to meet with me as soon as possible and to contact the Dean's Office (at extension 4262) to better insure that accommodations are provided in a timely manner.

 

Schedule of Topics and Readings
(For each class meeting, you are advised to read
the material in the order presented in the schedule)

SKEPTICISM & KNOWLEDGE

September

12
Discussion: On Skeptical Arguments
Readings:

i) Descartes, from Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations I & II
ii) Moore, "Proof of the External World," "Four Forms of Skepticism," and "Certainty"
iii) Unger, "A Defense of Skepticism"

19
Discussion: On Skeptical Arguments II
Readings:

i) Lehrer, "Why Not Skepticism?"
ii) Vogel, "Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation"
iii) Cruz, "Is There Reason for Skepticism?"

26
Discussion: The Gettier Problem and Justificationism
Readings:

i) Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"
ii) Klein, "Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,"


October

3
Discussion: Causal and Tracking theories
Readings: Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing"
Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism" First Half | Second Half

10
 READING PERIOD: NO CLASS
17
Discussion: Contextualism
Readings: i) Cohen, "Knowledge and Context"
ii) DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem"
iii) Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism"
 

JUSTIFICATION

24
Discussion: Foundationalism & Coherentism
Readings:

i) Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism"
i) Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?"


31
Discussion: Foundationalism & Coherentism II
Readings: Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given"
Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid"

November

7
Discussion: Reliabilism and the move to externalism
Readings: i) Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?"
ii) Plantinga, "Warrant: A First Approximation"
iii) Connee & Feldman, "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism"

14
Discussion: Internalism versus Externalism
Readings: i) Lehrer, "Externalism and Epistemology Naturalized"
ii) Cruz & Pollock, "The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism"
iii) Goldman, "Internalism Exposed"

 META-EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES

21
Discussion: Epistemic Naturalism
Readings: i) Quine, "Epistemology naturalized"
ii) Kornblith, "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory,"
iii) Kim, "What is naturalized epistemology?"

28
Discussion: Epistemic Naturalism II
Readings: i) Antony, "Quine as Feminist" Part I | Part II
ii) Bonjour, "Against Naturalized Epistemology"

December

5
Discussion: Epistemology without philosophy?
Readings: i) Goldman, "Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology"
ii) Nichols, Stich, & Weinberg, "Metaskepticism: Meditations on Ethno-Epistemology"
iii) Sosa, "A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Epistemology"

16
 FINAL ESSAY DUE at 5pm (email or Professor's mailbox)



FURTHER READING IN CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY
(The material in this section is not required for the course)


Alston, W. (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted? Philosophical Studies, 29, 287-305.

Alston, W. (1980). Level Confusions in Epistemology. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume V: Studies in Epistemology . Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Alston, W. (1986). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Philosophical Topics, 14(1).

Alston, W. (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Sythese, 74, 265-283.

Audi, R. (1989a). Causalist Internalism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 26(4), 309-320.

Audi, R. (1989b). Justification, Truth, and Reliability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49(1), 1-29.

Bonjour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Bonjour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. New York: Oxford.

Bonjour, L. (199). The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism. In Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 117-142.

Chisholm, R. M. (1989). Theory of Knowledge. (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Chisholm, R. M. (1990). The Status of Epistemic Principles. Nous 209: 209-15.

Code, L. (1991). What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

Conee, E. (1988). The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification. The Monist, July

Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. (Eds.) (1992). A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell pub., Lmt.

Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Feldman, R. (1999). Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology. In Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 170-186.

Foley, R. (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Foley, R. (1994). Quine and Naturalized Epistemology. In P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX, Philosophical Naturalism (pp. 243-260). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Fumerton, R. (1994). Skepticism and Naturalistic Epistemology. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIX: Philosophical Naturalism (pp. 321-340). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Goldman, A. I. (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 73(20), 771-791.

Goldman, A. I. (1980). The Internalist Conception of Justification. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy V (pp. 27-51). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Goldman, A. I. (1994). Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol XIX: Philosophical Naturalism (pp. 301-320). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Goldman, A. I. (1999). A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology. In Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. pp. 1-28.

Haack, S. (1993). Evidence and Inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell.

Harman, G. (1970). Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 844-855.

Kitcher, P. (1992). The Naturalists Return. The Philosophical Review, 101(1), 53-114.

Kornblith, H. (1989b). The Unattainability of Coherence. In J. Bender (Ed.), The Current State of the Coherence Theory (pp. 207-214). Cambridge: Kluwer.

Kornblith, H. (1994a). Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX: Philosophical Naturalism (pp. 39-52). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kornblith, H. (Ed.). (1994b). Naturalizing Epistemology (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kornblith, H. (1999). In Defense of Naturalized Epistemology. In Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 158-169.

Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. New York: Routledge.

Maffie, J. (1990). Recent Work on Naturalized Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, 281-293.

Pappas, G. (1979). Basing Relations. In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and Knowledge (pp. 1-23). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Plantinga, A. (1993b). Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. (1999) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sosa, E. (1991). Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology . New York: Cambridge UP.

Stich, S. (1990). Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Williams, M. (1991). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Vogel, J. (1999). The New Relevant Alternatives Theory. In Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. pp. 155-180.

Zagzebski, L. (1999). What is Knowledge? In Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 92-116.