The nature of consciousness remains a fundamental mystery of the universe. Our internal, felt experience — what chocolate tastes like to oneself, what it is like to see the color red, or, more broadly, what it is like to have a first person, waking perspective at all — resists explanation in any terms other than the conscious experience itself in spite of centuries of intense effort by philosophers and, more recently, by scientists. As a result, some prominent researchers propose that the existence of consciousness requires a revision of basic physics, while others (seemingly desperately) deny that consciousness exists at all. Those positions remain extreme, but the challenge that consciousness poses is dramatic. It is at the same time the most intimately known fact of our humanity and science’s most elusive puzzle.

In this tutorial we will read the contemporary literature on consciousness. We will concentrate both on making precise the philosophical problem(s) of consciousness and on understanding the role of the relevant neuroscientific and cognitive research. Tutorial partners will have an opportunity to spend the end of the semester working on a special topic of their choosing including, for instance, consciousness and freewill, consciousness and artificial intelligence, disorders of consciousness, or the scientific reduction of mind to brain.

This is a writing intensive course.

REQUIRED TEXTS

Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford UP.

The majority of our readings will be from the contemporary literature in philosophy and neuropsychology. These will by and large be available as electronic resources.

GRADING

1. Tutorial Essays

In this tutorial you will present FIVE essays, approximately 7-9 pages each.

In these essays you will be expected to engage substantial themes that arise in the readings. You may elect to focus carefully on a single strand of argumentation in one of the readings, or you may attempt a more synthetic treatment of the several pieces that you read that week.

PLEASE EMAIL OR DELIVER YOUR PAPER TO YOUR TUTORIAL PARTNER (AND TO THE INSTRUCTOR) BY 5PM THE DAY BEFORE YOUR MEETING. Essays should be typewritten, double spaced in a 12 point font with 1 inch margins. No title page.

You will present your tutorial essay during tutorial meetings.

Each tutorial essay is worth 15% of your final grade.

2. Tutorial Participation and Critical Notes

Critical discussion during meetings is the heart of the tutorial. On weeks where you do not present, you will be expected to engage your tutorial partner's work thoughtfully, energentically, tenaciously, and respectfully. You will already have read your partner's paper once, and you are strongly encouraged to prepare beforehand notes that you will draw on for the conversation. Note that a critical discussion does not demand that one criticize. You are encouraged to signal your elaborations and sympathetic amendments to your partner's work.

Tutorial notes will likely be 2-3 pages, and may be turned in at the end of the tutorial meeting.

Participation in the tutorial and your tutorial discussion notes will constitute 15% of the final grade.

3. Independent Topics Research and Essay

The last two weeks of the tutorial are given over to themes within consciousness research that are of interest to you. For one of the independent project weeks, you will be responsible for assigning required reading and for compiling a brief bibliography of additional material. For that week you will also lead the tutorial meeting and present your own work on the topic you selected.

You will be expected to prepare your usual conversation notes on the week when your partner is presenting her independent research material.

Selection of assigned readings and preparation of a brief bibliography will constitute 10% of your final grade.

TUTORIAL RESOURCES

Office Hours - The instructor is available for office meetings each week in Harper House 9. Students may visit individually or in groups. By appointment, or during the following open-door times:

Tuesdays	10-Noon
Wednesdays	12:30pm-1:30pm
Thursdays	10am-Noon

Instant Messaging - The instructor will occassionally be available via AIM. You may check anytime, but especially from 11pm to1am on Sunday through Thursday nights. My screen name is profjcruz.

Consciousness and Qualia Bibliography and Consciousness in Science Bibiliography - Professor David Chalmers has prepared two comprehensive bibliographies of work on consciousness.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

Below you will find the minimal and required reading for each week of the course. For each week there is an associated bibliography of additional material that you are encouraged to pursue.

Supplementary tutorial material

Week One

Akins, K. (1993) What is it like to be boring and myopic? In Dennett and his Critics, Dahlbom, B., ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

Baker, L. R. (1998) The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:327-348.

Bieri, P. (1995) Why is consciousness puzzling? In Conscious Experience, Metzinger, T., ed. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.

Dennett, D. C. (1996) Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:4-6.

Flanagan, O. J. (1985) Consciousness, naturalism and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:373-90.

Hardcastle, V. G. (1993) The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:27-50.

Horst, S. (1999) Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:39-48.

Kekes, J. (1977) Physicalism and subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37:533-6.

Kirk, R. (1991) Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem? Analysis 51:17-23.

Lycan, W. G. (1990) What is the "subjectivity" of the mental? Philosophical Perspectives.

Sturgeon, S. (1994) The epistemic basis of subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy 91:221-35.

Malcolm, N. (1988) Subjectivity. Philosophy 63:147-60.

van Gulick, R. (1985) Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Topics 13:51-70.

Week 2

Churchland, P. M. (1985) Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82:8-28. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989).

Churchland, P. M. (1989) Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Conee, E. (1985) Physicalism and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Quarterly 35:296-302.

Conee, E. (1994) Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Dennett, D. C. (1991)"Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained, pp. 398-406. Boston: Little-Brown.

Gertler, B. (1999) A defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies 93:317-336.

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. (2000) "Mary Mary, quite contrary"

Horgan, T. (1984) Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34:147-83.

Jackson, F. (1986) What Mary didn't know. Journal of Philosophy 83:291-5.

Lycan, W. G. (1998) Phenomenal information again: It is both real and intrinsically perspectival. Philosophical Psychology 11:239-42.

Nida-Rumelin, M. (1995) What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal states. In Conscious Experience, Metzinger, T. (ed). Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
 
Papineau, D. (1993) Physicalism, consciousness, and the antipathetic fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:169-83.

Pereboom, D. (1994) Bats, brain scientists, and the limits of introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:315-29.
 
Thompson, E. (1992) Novel colors. Philosophical Studies 68:321-49.

Week Three

Alkire, M. T. , Haier, R. J. , & James, H. F. (1998) Toward the neurobiology of consciousness: Using brain imaging and anesthesia to investigate the anatomy of consciousness. In Toward a Science of Consciousness II, Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A. & Scott, A., eds. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bogen, J. E. (1995) On the neurophysiology of consciousness, part I: An overview. Consciousness and Cognition 4:52-62.

Crick, F. (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis: the scientific search for the soul. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.

Damasio, A. (2000) A neurobiology for consciousness. In Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Metzinger, T., ed.. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dennett, D. (2001) Consciousness: How much is that in real money?

Kanwisher, N. (2001) Neural events and perceptual awareness. Cognition 79:89-113.

Koch, C. & Crick, F. (2000) Some thoughts on consciousness and neuroscience. In The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition, M. Gazzaniga, M. ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Logothetis, N. K. (1999) Binocular rivalry: A window onto consciousness. Scientific American.

McGinn, C. (1995) Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M., eds. (1994) Consciousness in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. Hillsdale, N.J. : L. Erlbaum.

Weeks Four & Five

Balog, K. (1999) Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.  Philosophical Review 108:497-528.

Hill, C. S. & McLaughlin, B. P. (1998) There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers' philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. LIX: 445-454.

Nagel, T. (1998) Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem. Philosophy 73:337-52.

Searle, J. (1997) Consciousness & the Philosophers.  New York Review of Books.  Volume 44, Number 4 (March 6).

Shear, J. (ed) (1997)  Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. Cambridge: MIT Press.
(This is a collection of papers on Chalmers' work.)

Stoljar, D. (2001) The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical.  In Philosophical Perspectives, 15, Metaphysics, Tomberlin, J., ed.  Oxford: Blackwell.

van Gulick, R. (1999) Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments.  In Toward a Science of Consciousness III, Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A. & Chalmers, D., eds. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Weeks Six & Seven

Paul Azzopardi & Alan Cowey, Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision?

Axel Cleeremans & John-Dylan Haynes, Correlating consciousness: A view from empirical science

Christof Koch, Towards the neuronal substrate of visual consciousness

Geraint Rees, Gabriel Kreiman, & Christof Koch, Neural correlates of consciousness in humans

Alva Noë & Evan Thompson, Are there neural correlates of consciousness?

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Consciousness: A natural history

Week Eight

Brown, J. (1989) The nature of voluntary action. Brain and Cognition 10: 105-120.

Ramachandran, V. S., et. al. (1996) Illusions of body image: What they reveal about human nature. In The Mind Brain Continuum, Lliinas, R., and Churchland, P.S., (eds.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wegner, D. M. and Wheatley, T. (1999) Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 54: 480-491.