Farrah Musani

PHIL 304T – Sawicki

Paper #4

Human consciousness is described by Sartre as limitless, full of endless possibilities, and as a result of this, constantly negating itself because it does not remain constant and unchanged through temporal flux. One’s present self is separated both from one’s past and future selves by nothingness—each self is ‘nihilated’ as a being is for itself, that is, becomes conscious of its own consciousness. The awareness of consciousness sets consciousness as an object apart from the self, thus "human reality is constituted as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is" (298). Although Sartre makes this statement with regards to human reality in ‘bad faith,’ he elucidates why bad faith is inherent in the very structure of consciousness.

Sartre describes bad faith as a means of fleeing the anguish that "is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being" (285). The realization that nothingness is an integral part of consciousness results in anguish because one understands that there is nothing holding oneself to resolutions of the past nor consistent action in the future—and this is the very nature of freedom. "Nothing can ensure me against myself, cut off from the world and from my essence by this nothingness which I am" (289, emphasis given). This apprehension of freedom results in flight "by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a thing" (290, emphasis given).

Bad faith is thus the attempt to flee anguish, although "anguish, properly speaking can be neither hidden nor avoided" (290) because it is part of the being of consciousness. In emphasizing their inescapability, Sartre seems to be saying that anguish and nothingness are what one is, as these characteristics are inherent in the structure of being of consciousness because nothing else can be in terms of being in itself. All other qualities can be transcended except for anguish and nothingness. Yet he distinguishes anguish and nothingness as being rather than being in the mode of being of a thing. Thus even though they are constant and permanent, they cannot be transcended. In a rather contradictory way, the person behaving in bad faith attempts to treat anguish and nothingness as though they are, and can therefore be transcended. Bad faith can either be the absolutization of facticity (being in itself) or the denial of transcendence (being for itself), or perhaps both simultaneously.

In Sartre’s hands, an indecisive and flirtatious woman becomes a paradigm of insincerity and bad faith. Sartre describes the manner in which our heroine is in bad faith to herself as she flirts with her date. She refuses to conceive of his purported advances as such, and instead chooses to accept them at face value without extrapolating in temporal flux past the present. In this way, she treats him as a thing, as a being in the mode of being of a thing, because she (deliberately) does not see the possibility of his transcendence. She is denying him possibility, acting as his "master" or "guard" by constituting her consciousness "in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility" (291, emphasis given). Sartre explains that she is delaying making the choice about whether or not to respond to the intentions which "she knows very well…(he) cherishes regarding her" (293).

Simultaneous with this denial of transcendence, she acknowledges transcendence in allowing herself to "enjoy his desire", for "she would find no charm in a respect which would be only respect" (293). This is characteristic of Sartre’s description of bad faith: the person in question must, to some extent, be aware that he or she is lying to his- or herself. "(C)onsciousness affects itself with bad faith. There must be an original intention and a project of bad faith" (292, my emphasis). The woman cannot be ignorant of her own contradictory attitudes because she possesses "the unity of a single consciousness" (292, emphasis given), and this is what makes her actions more reprehensible (though Sartre does not explicitly judge) than a common lie to the Other.

In addition to this simultaneity of acceptance and denial of transcendence, the woman also absolutizes the facticity of her body. Sartre describes how when her companion takes her hand, she dissociates herself from that hand so she neither resists nor acquiesces. Instead, she "draws (him) up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation" (293), in order to demonstrate that she is a consciousness. In so doing, she allows her body to be treated as (and indeed, treats it herself as) being in the mode of being of things even as she attempts to establish herself as something other than her facticity—as her transcendence.

Sartre proclaims of facticity and transcendence that "these two aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination" (293) while the person of bad faith "affirm(s) their identity while preserving their differences" (294). Thus the woman chooses both facticity and transcendence simultaneously, but still separately. They are not together, are not integrated. It is this false division in the consciousness to which Sartre seems to object. Though these objections certainly appear legitimate through his analysis and interpretation of her behavior, his argument contains flaws and oversights.

A different reading of Sartre’s example does not place the woman so decidedly in the wrong. Instead of laying the blame on the indecisive "coquette" (294), perhaps it makes more sense to attribute the bad faith to the way all people, men and women, behave towards one another. Humans conceive of one another as being in the mode of being of things rather than as the possibility of transcendence, yet they do not wish to be viewed in this way by others. Indeed, as Sartre points out, they tend to view themselves as purely transcendental, not integrating facticity at all; thus " I am on a plane where no reproach can touch me… I flee from myself, I escape myself, I leave my tattered garment in the hands on the fault-finder" (294).

In this way, the woman’s behavior towards the man on the date can be interpreted more as a form of self-defense: she retaliates against his conception of her as a being in the mode of being of things. Sartre does not address the issue that the man he has painted in his example is treating the woman as a thing, a "passive object" (294) in projecting his one-dimensional sexual desire onto her. He forces her to react in bad faith in order that she not allow herself to be objectified. It is natural that when he makes a physical advance such as taking her hand, she will strive to prove her consciousness so that he can view her as he views himself, not as pure facticity. The scenario can be viewed from another perspective wherein he presents her with a "No" (291) that does not allow her to fulfill her possibilities, that denies her of her transcendence.

Sartre also presumes that the man has these rather base intentions, which is surely doing a disservice to all men. Is it not possible that the man truly does admire the woman, and compliments her without an ulterior motive? For Sartre, apparently not. In addition, the woman is presumed to understand the man’s intentions, to expect them even though his actions do not betray him in the mode of being in itself. There appears to be a contradiction here because Sartre, while insisting on the limitless possibilities that freedom bestows on the human being, here requires the woman to expect only one intention. Sartre himself is imposing the "No" (291) in limiting the man’s possibilities. If the self sets no precedent for itself, than how can one expect that it follow a rational, linear projection of being?

And one final objection to this example is Sartre’s characterization of indecision as bad faith. He states, "(S)he does not quite know what she wants." (293). Is it not possible that, in not responding to his advances immediately, she is trying to decide? Perhaps she does have the answer within her, but one cannot fault her for attempting to work through her indecision to find it. Kierkegaard was certainly an advocate of the notion that the truth of choice lies within oneself, and in conjunction with this, much reflection needed to precede the choice in order to make it worthwhile. Even if the woman desires the man, this is not reason enough to respond favorably to his advances. The choice must be based on more than the physical desire in order to be valid. Sartre’s attitude towards woman is vaguely reminiscent of Freud’s attitude towards his patient Dora, who did not acquiesce to the man who made sexual advances towards her: if the man is attractive, it is only natural that she should sleep with him. If she does not choose to, it is surely some sign of dysfunction, or in this case, bad faith.

Perhaps Sartre’s conception of the ideal first date situation is that the woman should accept only if she intends to sleep with the man. But this reduces all personal relationships between people to a rapid evaluation of the other person as simply the objective use that they can provide. It also limits the possibilities of the human being; freedom becomes useless because people are not allowed to exercise it. Instead, they receive the "No" from all sides as they are pigeonholed into the mode of being in itself. Thus Sartre succeeds in boxing himself in with his own explanation by not accepting the being of consciousness of the people in his examples.