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AN ACCOUNT OF ABSTRACT IDEAS
Maria Jimenez
Introduction
In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley attempts to show that believing in mind-independent
matter leads to absurdity and skepticism. Berkeley invites us
to accept instead the doctrine of idealism, where the only things
that exist are minds and ideas. Philonous – the spokesperson for
Berkeley's considered view – uses several different kinds of argument
to convince Hylas of idealism. In this paper I will investigate
one type of argument that Philonous offers. Philonous claims that
we cannot form abstract ideas, and suggests that the impossibility
of abstract ideas deprives Hylas of an otherwise promising conception
of mind-independent matter (pp. 28-30). I will show that, contrary
to Philonous' claims, abstract ideas are possible. This will not
by itself prove that matter exists. If I am right, however, then
Hylas can argue that our idea of matter is an abstract idea.
Idealism and Abstract Ideas
Berkeley must offer some reason to reject abstract ideas. In order
to understand the importance of this for Berkeley's project, we
need to consider Philonous' primary strategy of argumentation.
In the first dialogue, Philonous invites Hylas to consider his
ideas of sensible things. In plainer language, we may say that
Philonous invites Hylas to consider the kinds of ideas that his
senses give him. Unsurprisingly, senses deliver sensible ideas
such as smells, tastes and visual images. Philonous then points
out that on this conception of sensible things, Hylas does not
have a sensible idea of the cause of his sensible ideas (p. 10).
For example, in considering the heat of a fire, Philonous argues
that Hylas has a sensible idea of heat (as a pain) and a sensible
idea of the appearance of the flame, but that there is no sensible
idea of the cause of the heat (p. 11). Likewise, Hylas' idea of
a sound is not an idea of the motion of the air (p. 17). Even
though we think that the motion of the air is the cause of sounds,
motion is merely another sensible. We do not have an idea of the
motion as a cause of sound. At best, science can uncover that
the sensible idea of sound and motion in the air always appear
together. This is not the same as discovering that the motion
causes the idea of sound. If it is the case that Hylas has no
sensible idea of the cause of the heat or sound, then Hylas will
be in no position to defend his belief in a mind-independent matter
that underlies the heat or sound. That is, if Hylas has no idea
of fire beyond his sensible idea of the heat, then he will have
no grounds for believing in fire as anything but a sensible idea.
The problem for Hylas is that this argument works equally well
for anything. So, there appears to be no grounds for believing
in mind-independent reality beyond sensible ideas.
Hylas suggests that the nature of matter might be better understood
as an abstraction from the particular sensible qualities that
we attribute to matter. The reason that Hylas' maneuver is attractive
is that Philonous' argument to this point has been to show that
we only have access to our ideas and that we do not have an immediate
sensible idea of the cause or basis of our ideas. Philonous has
shown that if we only have access to our ideas, there could never
be evidence for matter that is independent of ideas. If, on the
other hand, Hylas could show that we have an abstract idea of
the qualities of matter, then he would not be forced into discussing
particular sensible qualities such as the pain of heat. Thus,
perhaps matter itself could be an abstract idea.
Philonous needs some way to address the possibility of an abstract
conception of matter. The following passages are the heart of
Philonous' argument against abstract ideas:
Phil. ...Without a doubt you can tell, whether you are able to
frame this is or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute
on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract
idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes,
as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the
like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will
then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will
be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you
have no notion of (p. 28).
Later, Philonous says, "...try if you can frame the idea of any
figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from
other sensible qualities" (p. 29; for further discussion, see
p. 56 ). If Hylas finds that he cannot, Philonous will conclude
that it is repugnant to believe that there should exist something
in nature that we cannot conceive. Philonous is challenging Hylas
to frame in his mind an idea of something without also framing
in mind particular sensible qualities such as shape, color or
texture. In order to see the kind of challenge Philonous is presenting,
take, for example, the idea of a person. We may ask whether or
not it is possible to bring to mind the abstract idea of a person,
without bringing to mind a person of a certain height, a certain
build, or a certain color. Any example of an abstract idea would
be dangerous for Philonous, as it would show that it is possible
to imagine something devoid of sensible qualities. Since Philonous'
entire project is based on showing that we have no sensible idea
of matter, Hylas is trying to show that we have some other kind
of immediate idea of matter.
A Theory of Abstract Ideas
There appears to be a way to think about things without specifying
the exact sensible properties of that thing. We can think about
a car without thinking about a particular kind of car (Toyota
or Ford or Acura, etc.) and without thinking about a particular
shape or color. It seems that we do this when we ask, “are you
going to buy a car this year?” When I ask this question, I do
not have a particular kind of car in my mind since I do not know
what kind of car you would buy in the future. After all, how could
I have any idea at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms
of its specific properties, when you have not bought it yet? So,
there must be some way that the mind works to specify a ‘core’
of an idea such that the core is able to have particular properties
attached to it. On this view, when I say “car,” I am activating
the core of the idea in my mind without activating particular
properties that can be attached to that core.
One way of thinking about Berkeley's overall strategy is that
he thinks that our mental life is homogeneous. He thinks that
everything we find in our minds is an idea, and that ideas are
indivisible things in the universe. (I will put aside Berkeley's
use of the term 'notion' for the purposes of this paper.) It is
possible, though, to relax this assumption. Suppose, following
the suggestions above, that we view an idea as having two components:
the first component is the core of the idea, while the second
is the set of properties that apply to that idea. Again, the core
of the idea is what the particular properties get attached to.
Indeed, the properties may change, but the core stays the same.
So, for example, a bicycle may be painted red for many years but
will eventually rust. The color as a property of the bicycle changes,
but the core of the idea of the bicycle does not.
Of course, Philonous will view this as begging the question. That
is, he will think that by supposing that ideas have cores, I am
simply assuming that the view that ideas are entirely composed
of sensible particulars is false. We find evidence for my view,
however, in a simple game played by children. In the game "twenty
questions," one player (the imaginer) forms an idea in her mind
– usually of some noun – while another player (the questioner)
is challenged to determine what that idea is. The questioner is
allowed to ask up to twenty diagnostic 'yes or no' questions in
order to arrive at the idea that the imaginer has in mind. There
are two strategies that the questioner can follow. She might ask
particular questions such as, "Are you thinking of a platypus?"
This is clearly not a good plan, as the questioner will quickly
reach twenty questions and only has a small chance of correctly
guessing what the imaginer has in mind.
A much better strategy is to start with abstract questions such
as, "Is the thing you are thinking of an animal?" When the questioner
pursues this strategy, it does not seem plausible to think that
she, the questioner, has a particular idea in mind. That is, the
questioner does not have a particular animal in mind. She is using
the word 'animal' as a place-holder for all animals. We can be
certain that the questioner has formed an idea in her mind. This
is because she is able to refine the idea further and further
based on the responses that the imaginer gives. Suppose that the
imaginer's answer is 'yes.' The questioner then has an idea in
her mind of something that is an animal, but not a particular
animal. If it were a particular animal, then the questioner would
lapse into the particularist strategy (by asking, for example,
"Are you thinking of a wildebeest?") The questioner might make
this move after the first question, but she need not. Again we
can see that a better strategy would be to remain at the level
of the abstract by asking, for instance, "Are you thinking of
a mammal?" The point is that the idea is guiding abstract questions,
so it must itself be an abstract idea.
Are Abstract Ideas Merely Words?
Is our ability to play twenty questions a mere artifact of the
words used in the game? Philonous apparently thinks that we must
"lay aside the words" in order to "contemplate the bare ideas"
(p. 29). It seems that Philonous is worried that the ability of
words to convey abstract ideas is misleading with respect to the
question of whether or not we can have ideas of abstractions.
When Hylas brings up the case of mathematical objects, Philonous
claims that the ideas are particular even if the words (such as
triangle, line, or sum) seem abstract.
Notice, however, that the words the questioner uses in the game
is not central to the issue. Rather, the ideas in the mind of
the questioner are what guide the game. We know this because the
moment before the questioner asks whether or not the imaginer
is thinking of an animal, the questioner must have some idea of
what she is going to ask. Without such an idea, she would not
know what words to formulate the question with. So the animal,
as an idea, must be in her mind before she utters the words of
the question. I conclude that abstract ideas – construed as cores
of ideas – are not merely words. Further, I conclude that Hylas
has a more promising strategy in resisting idealism by defending
abstract ideas than Berkeley allows.
References
Berkeley, George. (1994/1713) Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. R. Adams, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett. |
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