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AN ACCOUNT OF ABSTRACT IDEAS
Maria Jimenez
In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley attempts to show that believing in mind-independent
matter leads to absurdity and skepticism. Berkeley invites us
to accept instead the doctrine of idealism, where the only things
that exist are minds and ideas. Philonous – the spokesperson for
Berkeley's considered view – uses several different kinds of argument
to convince Hylas of idealism. In this paper I will investigate
one type of argument that Philonous offers. Philonous claims that
we cannot form abstract ideas, and suggests that the impossibility
of abstract ideas deprives Hylas of an otherwise promising conception
of mind-independent matter (pp. 28-30). I will show that, contrary
to Philonous' claims, abstract ideas are possible. This will not
by itself prove that matter exists. If I am right, however, then
Hylas can argue that our idea of matter is an abstract idea, and
therefore immune to Philonous' most convincing strategies.
In order to understand the importance of rejecting abstract ideas
for Berkeley's project, we need to consider Philonous' primary
strategy of argumentation. In the first dialogue, Philonous invites
Hylas to consider his ideas of sensible things. In plainer language,
we may say that Philonous invites Hylas to consider the kinds
of ideas that his senses give him. Unsurprisingly, senses deliver
sensible ideas such as smells, tastes and visual images. Philonous
then points out that Hylas does not have a sensible idea of the
cause of his sensible ideas (p. 10). For example, in considering
the heat of a fire, Philonous argues that Hylas has a sensible
idea of heat and a sensible idea of the appearance of the flame,
but that there is no sensible idea of the cause of the heat (p.
11). If it is the case that Hylas has no sensible idea of the
cause of the heat, then Hylas will be in no position to defend
his belief in a mind-independent matter that underlies the heat.
That is, if Hylas has no idea of fire beyond his sensible idea
of the heat, then he will have no grounds for believing in fire
as anything but a sensible idea. The problem for Hylas is that
this argument works equally well for anything. So, there appears
to be no grounds for believing in mind-independent reality beyond
sensible ideas.
Hylas suggests that the nature of matter might be better understood
as an abstraction from the particular sensible qualities that
we attribute to matter. The reason that Hylas' maneuver is attractive
is that Philonous' argument to this point has been to show that
we only have access to our ideas and that we do not have an immediate
sensible idea of the cause or basis of our ideas. Philonous has
shown that if we only have access to our ideas, there could never
be evidence for matter that is independent of ideas. If, on the
other hand, Hylas could show that we have an abstract idea of
the qualities of matter, then he would not be forced into discussing
particular sensible qualities such as the pain of heat. Thus,
matter itself could be an abstract idea.
Philonous needs some way to address the possibility of an abstract
conception of matter. The following passages are the core of Philonous'
argument against abstract ideas:
Phil. ...Without a doubt you can tell, whether you are able to
frame this is or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute
on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract
idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes,
as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the
like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will
then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will
be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you
have no notion of (p. 28).
Later, Philonous says, "...try if you can frame the idea of any
figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from
other sensible qualities" (p. 29; for further discussion, see
p. 56 ). If Hylas finds that he cannot, Philonous will conclude
that it is repugnant to believe that there should exist something
in nature that we cannot conceive. Philonous is challenging Hylas
to frame in his mind an idea of something without also framing
in mind particular sensible qualities such as shape, color or
texture. In order to see the kind of challenge Philonous is presenting,
take, for example, the idea of a person. We may ask whether or
not it is possible to bring to mind the abstract idea of a person,
without bringing to mind a person of a certain height, a certain
build, or a certain color. Any example of an abstract idea would
be dangerous for Philonous, as it would show that it is possible
to imagine something devoid of sensible qualities. Since Philonous'
entire project is based on showing that we have no sensible idea
of matter, Hylas is trying to show that we have some other kind
of immediate idea of matter.
There appears to be a way that we think about things without specifying
the exact sensible properties of that thing. We can think about
a car without thinking about a particular kind of car (Toyota
or Ford or Acura, etc.) and without thinking about a particular
shape or color. It seems that we do this when we say, “are you
going to buy a car this year?” In my question, I do not have a
particular kind of car in my mind since I do not know what kind
of car you would buy in the future (how could I have any idea
at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms of its specific
properties, when you have not bought it yet?) So, there must be
some way that the mind works to specify a ‘core’ for particular
aspects of an idea like color, shape, texture etc. When I say
“a car” I am activating the core of the idea in my mind, without
activating particular properties that can be attached to the core.
One way of thinking about Berkeley's strategy is that he thinks
that our mental life is homogeneous. He thinks that everything
we find in our minds is an idea, and that ideas are indivisible
things in the universe (put aside Berkeley's use of the term 'notion'
for the purposes of this paper). It is possible, though, to relax
this assumption. Suppose we view an idea as having two components:
the first component is the core of the idea, while the second
is the properties that apply to that idea. The core of the idea
is what the particular properties get attached to. Indeed, the
properties may change, but the core stays the same. So, for example,
a bicycle may be painted red for many year but will eventually
rust. The color as a property of the bicycle changes, but the
core of the idea of the bicycle does not.
Of course, Philonous will view this as begging the question. That
is, he might think that by supposing that ideas have cores, I
am simply assuming that the view that ideas are entirely composed
of sensible particulars is false. I need some evidence for the
supposing that ideas have two kinds of components. We find evidence
in a simple game played by children. In the game "twenty questions,"
one player (the imaginer) forms an idea in her mind – usually
of some noun – while another player (the questioner) is challenged
to determine what that idea is. The questioner is allowed to ask
up to twenty diagnostic 'yes or no' questions in order to arrive
at the idea that the imaginer has in mind. There are two strategies
that the questioner can follow. She might ask particular questions
such as, "Are you thinking of a platypus?" This is clearly not
a good plan, as the questioner will quickly reach twenty questions
and only has a small chance of correctly guessing what the imaginer
has in mind.
A much better strategy is to start with abstract questions such
as, "Is the thing you are thinking of an animal?" When the questioner
pursues this strategy, it does not seem plausible to think that
she, the questioner, has a particular idea in mind. That is, the
questioner does not have a particular animal in mind. She is using
the word animal as a place-holder for all animals. We can be certain
that the questioner has formed an idea in her mind. This is because
she able to refine the idea further and further based on the responses
that the imaginer gives. Suppose that the imaginer's answer is
'yes.' The questioner then has an idea in her mind of something
that is an animal, but not a particular animal. If it were a particular
animal, then the questioner would lapse into the particularist
strategy (by asking, for example, "Are you thinking of a wildebeest?")
The questioner might make this move after the first question,
but she need not. Again we can see that a better strategy would
be to remain at the level of the abstract by asking, for instance,
"Are you thinking of a mammal?" This point is that the idea is
guiding abstract questions, so it must itself be an abstract idea.
Is this a mere artifact of the words used in the game? Philonous
apparently thinks that we must "lay aside the words" in order
to "contemplate the bare ideas" (p. 29). It seems that Philonous
is worried that the ability of words to convey abstract ideas
is misleading with respect to the question of whether or not we
can have ideas of abstractions. The word the questioner uses in
the game is not central to issue. We know this because the moment
before the questioner asks whether or not the imaginer is thinking
of an animal, the questioner must have some idea of what she is
going to ask. So the animal, as an idea, must be in her mind before
she utters the words of the question. It appears that Philonous
draws our attention to the words we use in order to distract us
from the possibility of abstract ideas.
There is some evidence for the claim that something can be an
idea and be abstract at the same time. I have tried to show in
this paper that the doctrine of abstract ideas is not as hopeless
as Philonous claims. |
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