Third Draft

[Williams College]

Third Draft

At this point you should take great care to carry the reader along and fill in all the details necessary to understand the paper. More importantly, you have been thinking about the argument for a long time now. You should settle on the best way of putting it. For example, in this draft, the writer has decided to drop the formulation of her idea that invokes a ‘container’ for sensible properties. She prefers here to put it in terms of ideas having an abstract ‘core’ and having properties that 'attach' to that core.

[Williams College]

Third Draft

At this point you should take great care to carry the reader along and fill in all the details necessary to understand the paper. More importantly, you have been thinking about the argument for a long time now. You should settle on the best way of putting it. For example, in this draft, the writer has decided to drop the formulation of her idea that invokes a ‘container’ for sensible properties. She prefers here to put it in terms of ideas having an abstract ‘core’ and having properties that 'attach' to that core.

AN ACCOUNT OF ABSTRACT IDEAS

Maria Jimenez

In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley argues that there is no such thing as matter that is independent from the mind (idealism). One way that Berkeley argues this is by showing that abstract ideas are not possible. If no abstract ideas are possible, then everything is a particular idea. Particular ideas are perceptions are in the mind. If perceptions are in the mind, and every idea is a perception, then every idea is in the mind. If all of our ideas are in the mind and ideas are all we have, then everything is in the mind.

In this paper I will argue that abstract ideas are possible. This will not prove that matter exists. If I am right, however, then Hylas can argue that our idea of matter is an abstract idea, and therefore immune to Philonous' most convincing strategies. So, if Hylas can avoid committing to a particular idea, which would always be a sensation, he might be able to make some headway against Philonous.

Hylas suggests that the nature of matter might be better understood as an abstraction from the particular sensible qualities that we attribute to matter. The reason that Hylas' maneuver is attractive is that Philonous' argument to this point has been to show that we only have access to our ideas. We do not have an immediate impression of the cause of our ideas. If Hylas could show that we have an idea of the abstract qualities of matter, then he would not be forced by the particular sensible qualities. When Hylas is challenged as to the source of this allegedly abstract idea, he speculates that perhaps "pure reason" is capable of forming abstractions (p. 29).

Philonous needs some way to address the possibility of an abstract conception of matter. The following passages are the core of Philonous' argument against abstract ideas:

Phil. ...Without a doubt you can tell, whether you are able to frame this is or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of (p. 28).

Later, Philonous says, "...try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities" (p. 29; for further discussion, see p. 56 ). If Hylas finds that he cannot, Philonous will conclude that it is repugnant to believe that there should exist something in nature that we cannot conceive. Philonous is challenging Hylas to frame in his mind an idea of something without also framing in mind particular sensible qualities such as shape, color or texture. Any example of an abstract idea would be dangerous for Philonous, as it would show that it is possible to imagine something devoid of sensible qualities. Since Philonous' entire project is based on showing that we have no sensible idea of matter, Hylas is trying to show that we have some other kind of immediate idea of matter. In order to see the kind of challenge Philonous is presenting, take, for example, the idea of a person. We may ask whether or not it is possible to bring to mind the abstract idea of a person, without bringing to mind a person of a certain height, a certain build, or a certain color.

There appears to be a way that we think about things without specifying the exact sensible properties of that thing. We can think about a car without thinking about a particular kind of car (Toyota or Ford or Acura, etc.) and without thinking about a particular shape or color. It seems that we do this when we say, “are you going to buy a car this year?” In my question, I don’t have a particular kind of car in my mind since I don’t know what kind of car you would buy in the future (how could I have any idea at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms of its specific properties, when you haven’t bought it yet?) So, there must be some way that the mind works to specify a ‘core’ for particular aspects of an idea like color, shape, texture etc. When I say “a car” I’m activating the core of the idea in my mind, without activating particular properties that can be attached to the core.

Suppose we view an idea as having two components: the first component is the core of the idea, while the second is the properties of idea. Philonous might view this as begging the question. That is, he might think that by supposing that ideas have cores, I am simply assuming that the view that ideas are composed of sensible particulars is false. It would appear that I need some evidence for the supposing that ideas have two kinds of components.

There is some evidence for two kinds of components from a simple game played by children. In the game "twenty questions," one player (the imaginer) forms an idea in her mind – usually of some noun – while another player (the questioner) is challenged to determine what that idea is. The questioner is allowed to ask up to twenty diagnostic 'yes or no' questions in order to arrive at the idea that the imaginer has in mind. There are two strategies that the questioner can follow. She might ask particular questions such as, "Are you thinking of a platypus?" This is clearly not a good plan, as the questioner will quickly reach twenty questions and only has a small chance of correctly guessing what the imaginer has in mind.

A much better strategy is to start with abstract questions such as, "Is the thing you are thinking of an animal?" When the questioner pursues this strategy, it does not seem plausible to think that she, the questioner, has a particular idea in mind. That is, the questioner does not have a particular animal in mind. She is using the word animal as a place-holder for all animals. We can be certain that the questioner has formed an idea in her mind. This is because she able to refine the idea further and further based on the responses that the imaginer gives. Suppose that the imaginer's answer is 'yes.' The questioner then has an idea in her mind of something that is an animal, but not a particular animal. If it were a particular animal, then the questioner would lapse into the particularist strategy (by asking, for example, "Are you thinking of a wildebeest?") The questioner might make this move after the first question, but she need not. Again we can see that a better strategy would be to remain at the level of the abstract by asking, for instance, "Are you thinking of a mammal?" This point is that the idea is guiding abstract questions, so it must itself be an abstract idea.

Is this a mere artifact of the words used in the game? Philonous apparently thinks that we must "lay aside the words" in order to "contemplate the bare ideas" (p. 29). It seems that Philonous is worried that the ability of words to convey abstracts is misleading with respect to the question of whether or not we can have ideas of abstractions. But I do not think that the word the questioner uses is central to issue. The moment before the questioner asks whether or not the imaginer is thinking of an animal, the questioner must have some idea of what she is going to ask. So animal, as an idea, must be in her mind before she utters the words of the question. It appears that we have demonstrated some evidence for the claim that something can be an idea and be abstract at the same time.
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The paper has been given a title. Notice that there is no pun, no joke and no silliness. While it is true that some philosophers write in a comedic style, the usual order of things is to get famous first and cute later. .

.

These are carried over from the previous draft.

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The writer is attempting to give a sense of what is at stake in the paper. There needs to be a reason why this particular topic is a proper target for deeper reflection. So, the writer offers a rationale for pursuing the issue in her paper. .

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Quotations that ground the discussion in the text were missing from the last draft. Here, the writer isolates a key discussion of abstract ideas and brings Berkeley's way of putting things to reader's attention. .

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Notice that the writer does not leave the quotations to speak for themselves. She interprets them for the reader. This in turn gives the reader a sense for how the writer is understanding Berkeley. .

.

The writer is now making a serious and careful attempt to articulate her theory of abstract ideas. She has already established a rationale for pursuing this topic. Now, it is her turn to advance a claim.

The student has changed the container theory to the 'core' theory. This -- in her view -- allows her to state the theory more easily without bringing to mind a potentially misleading analogy. What she is worried about is that the abstract part of an idea should not obscure the non-abstract parts. If sensory qualities were in a container (in, say, a box), one might worry that they would not be available to consciousness. Since sensory qualities are available to consciousness, the abstract part must be more 'inside' the idea. Thus, she begins to speak of the core of an idea.

Immediately after giving her account, the writer sets out to defend it. She attempts to give evidence that her view is right. She does not reference the dictionary or appeal to some authority. She gives reasons to accept her view.

Specifically, she offers a thought experiment. The hope is that, if the reader conducts the thought experiment himself, he will come to appreciate the merit of the author's claims.

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The author anticipates a possible reply by Berkeley and tries to respond to it. This part of the paper is somewhat tentative at this point. That is because the most important part at this stage is defending the main thesis. .

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This is looking more like a paper that can be turned in. It should still be revised for clarity. The next step is to put in enough ‘road signs’ so that the reader knows where the paper is going and what has been achieved. Particular sentences will need revision. The introductory paragraph should be rewritten for the last draft. The final part of the paper still needs work.

At this point it is crucial that the student read the paper aloud to herself. Better still, reading the paper to an audience will be extremely helpful. Stylistically, if a sentence does not sound right when read aloud, it should not be included in the paper. Substantively, if the listener cannot follow the line of thinking, revisions might be in order.
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AN ACCOUNT OF ABSTRACT IDEAS Maria Jimenez In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley argues that there is no such thing as matter that is independent from the mind (idealism). One way that Berkeley argues this is by showing that abstract ideas are not possible. If no abstract ideas are possible, then everything is a particular idea. Particular ideas are perceptions are in the mind. If perceptions are in the mind, and every idea is a perception, then every idea is in the mind. If all of our ideas are in the mind and ideas are all we have, then everything is in the mind. In this paper I will argue that abstract ideas are possible. This will not prove that matter exists. If I am right, however, then Hylas can argue that our idea of matter is an abstract idea, and therefore immune to Philonous' most convincing strategies. So, if Hylas can avoid committing to a particular idea, which would always be a sensation, he might be able to make some headway against Philonous. Hylas suggests that the nature of matter might be better understood as an abstraction from the particular sensible qualities that we attribute to matter. The reason that Hylas' maneuver is attractive is that Philonous' argument to this point has been to show that we only have access to our ideas. We do not have an immediate impression of the cause of our ideas. If Hylas could show that we have an idea of the abstract qualities of matter, then he would not be forced by the particular sensible qualities. When Hylas is challenged as to the source of this allegedly abstract idea, he speculates that perhaps "pure reason" is capable of forming abstractions (p. 29). Philonous needs some way to address the possibility of an abstract conception of matter. The following passages are the core of Philonous' argument against abstract ideas: Phil. ...Without a doubt you can tell, whether you are able to frame this is or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of (p. 28). Later, Philonous says, "...try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities" (p. 29; for further discussion, see p. 56 ). If Hylas finds that he cannot, Philonous will conclude that it is repugnant to believe that there should exist something in nature that we cannot conceive. Philonous is challenging Hylas to frame in his mind an idea of something without also framing in mind particular sensible qualities such as shape, color or texture. Any example of an abstract idea would be dangerous for Philonous, as it would show that it is possible to imagine something devoid of sensible qualities. Since Philonous' entire project is based on showing that we have no sensible idea of matter, Hylas is trying to show that we have some other kind of immediate idea of matter. In order to see the kind of challenge Philonous is presenting, take, for example, the idea of a person. We may ask whether or not it is possible to bring to mind the abstract idea of a person, without bringing to mind a person of a certain height, a certain build, or a certain color. There appears to be a way that we think about things without specifying the exact sensible properties of that thing. We can think about a car without thinking about a particular kind of car (Toyota or Ford or Acura, etc.) and without thinking about a particular shape or color. It seems that we do this when we say, “are you going to buy a car this year?” In my question, I don’t have a particular kind of car in my mind since I don’t know what kind of car you would buy in the future (how could I have any idea at all what kind of car you would buy, in terms of its specific properties, when you haven’t bought it yet?) So, there must be some way that the mind works to specify a ‘core’ for particular aspects of an idea like color, shape, texture etc. When I say “a car” I’m activating the core of the idea in my mind, without activating particular properties that can be attached to the core. Suppose we view an idea as having two components: the first component is the core of the idea, while the second is the properties of idea. Philonous might view this as begging the question. That is, he might think that by supposing that ideas have cores, I am simply assuming that the view that ideas are composed of sensible particulars is false. It would appear that I need some evidence for the supposing that ideas have two kinds of components. There is some evidence for two kinds of components from a simple game played by children. In the game "twenty questions," one player (the imaginer) forms an idea in her mind – usually of some noun – while another player (the questioner) is challenged to determine what that idea is. The questioner is allowed to ask up to twenty diagnostic 'yes or no' questions in order to arrive at the idea that the imaginer has in mind. There are two strategies that the questioner can follow. She might ask particular questions such as, "Are you thinking of a platypus?" This is clearly not a good plan, as the questioner will quickly reach twenty questions and only has a small chance of correctly guessing what the imaginer has in mind. A much better strategy is to start with abstract questions such as, "Is the thing you are thinking of an animal?" When the questioner pursues this strategy, it does not seem plausible to think that she, the questioner, has a particular idea in mind. That is, the questioner does not have a particular animal in mind. She is using the word animal as a place-holder for all animals. We can be certain that the questioner has formed an idea in her mind. This is because she able to refine the idea further and further based on the responses that the imaginer gives. Suppose that the imaginer's answer is 'yes.' The questioner then has an idea in her mind of something that is an animal, but not a particular animal. If it were a particular animal, then the questioner would lapse into the particularist strategy (by asking, for example, "Are you thinking of a wildebeest?") The questioner might make this move after the first question, but she need not. Again we can see that a better strategy would be to remain at the level of the abstract by asking, for instance, "Are you thinking of a mammal?" This point is that the idea is guiding abstract questions, so it must itself be an abstract idea. Is this a mere artifact of the words used in the game? Philonous apparently thinks that we must "lay aside the words" in order to "contemplate the bare ideas" (p. 29). It seems that Philonous is worried that the ability of words to convey abstracts is misleading with respect to the question of whether or not we can have ideas of abstractions. But I do not think that the word the questioner uses is central to issue. The moment before the questioner asks whether or not the imaginer is thinking of an animal, the questioner must have some idea of what she is going to ask. So animal, as an idea, must be in her mind before she utters the words of the question. It appears that we have demonstrated some evidence for the claim that something can be an idea and be abstract at the same time.	.	The paper has been given a title. Notice that there is no pun, no joke and no silliness. While it is true that some philosophers write in a comedic style, the usual order of things is to get famous first and cute later.	.

	.	These are carried over from the previous draft.	.

	.	The writer is attempting to give a sense of what is at stake in the paper. There needs to be a reason why this particular topic is a proper target for deeper reflection. So, the writer offers a rationale for pursuing the issue in her paper.	.

	.	Quotations that ground the discussion in the text were missing from the last draft. Here, the writer isolates a key discussion of abstract ideas and brings Berkeley's way of putting things to reader's attention.	.

	.	Notice that the writer does not leave the quotations to speak for themselves. She interprets them for the reader. This in turn gives the reader a sense for how the writer is understanding Berkeley.	.

	.	The writer is now making a serious and careful attempt to articulate her theory of abstract ideas. She has already established a rationale for pursuing this topic. Now, it is her turn to advance a claim. The student has changed the container theory to the 'core' theory. This -- in her view -- allows her to state the theory more easily without bringing to mind a potentially misleading analogy. What she is worried about is that the abstract part of an idea should not obscure the non-abstract parts. If sensory qualities were in a container (in, say, a box), one might worry that they would not be available to consciousness. Since sensory qualities are available to consciousness, the abstract part must be more 'inside' the idea. Thus, she begins to speak of the core of an idea. Immediately after giving her account, the writer sets out to defend it. She attempts to give evidence that her view is right. She does not reference the dictionary or appeal to some authority. She gives reasons to accept her view. Specifically, she offers a thought experiment. The hope is that, if the reader conducts the thought experiment himself, he will come to appreciate the merit of the author's claims.	.

	.	The author anticipates a possible reply by Berkeley and tries to respond to it. This part of the paper is somewhat tentative at this point. That is because the most important part at this stage is defending the main thesis.	.



.	This is looking more like a paper that can be turned in. It should still be revised for clarity. The next step is to put in enough ‘road signs’ so that the reader knows where the paper is going and what has been achieved. Particular sentences will need revision. The introductory paragraph should be rewritten for the last draft. The final part of the paper still needs work. At this point it is crucial that the student read the paper aloud to herself. Better still, reading the paper to an audience will be extremely helpful. Stylistically, if a sentence does not sound right when read aloud, it should not be included in the paper. Substantively, if the listener cannot follow the line of thinking, revisions might be in order.	.