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BERKELEY PAPER
FIRST DRAFT
At some point in the dialogues Hylas tries to defend his belief
in matter by claiming that we have an abstract idea of matter.
I think that he does this because every time he appeals to his
particular idea of a thing, Philonous shows that it’s only a perception
of that thing, and that perceptions are in the mind. (If perceptions
are in the mind, and every idea is a perception, then every idea
is in the mind. If all of our ideas are in the mind and ideas
are all we have, then everything is in the mind. At least, that
appears to be the main strategy, as in the argument with the vessel
of water (pp. 14-15), or the argument about the color of the clouds
(p. 20 .))
So, if Hylas can avoid committing to a particular idea, which
would always be a sensation, he might be able to make some headway
against Philonous. Hylas seems to have a point. We do seem to
have abstract ideas of things. If I could show that our idea of
matter is abstract, then Philonous’ main argument would be short
circuited.
After talking with a couple of people about abstract ideas, I
came up with this thought: Maybe there’s a way that we think about
things without specifying the exact sensible properties of that
thing. Like, sometimes we can think about a car without thinking
about a particular kind of car (Toyota or Ford or Acura, etc.)
and without thinking about a particular shape or color. It seems
that we do this sometimes, as when I say, “are you going to buy
a car this year?” In my question, I don’t have a particular kind
of car in my mind since I don’t know what kind of car you would
buy in the future (how could I have any idea at all what kind
of car you would buy, in terms of its specific properties, when
you haven’t bought it yet?) So, there must be some way that the
mind works to specify a ‘container’ for particular aspects of
an idea like color, shape, texture etc. When I say “a car” I’m
activating the container in my mind, without activating particular
properties. Maybe the container is what Hylas needs for his theory
of abstract ideas. What I need is some way to say all this that
is clear.
Anyway, there are two places where Hylas and Philonous talk about
abstract ideas. The first argument about abstract ideas takes
place on page 28 and 29:
Phil. ...Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If
you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion
or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and
slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are
acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the
point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable
on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion
of.
Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.
This is where Hylas needs a theory of abstract ideas. Philonous
has challenged him to frame an abstract idea of something ‘divested
of all those sensible modes.’ In other words, he is challenging
Hylas to come up with an idea of something without at the same
time coming up with an idea of a particular thing. The conversation
goes on:
Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion,
from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the
distinction term secondary?
Hyl. What! is it not an easy matter, to consider extension and
motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities?
Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?
Then they discuss math. I think that Hylas brings up math because
that seems very abstract.
Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning
any other; and in this sense to consider or treat of them abstractedly.
But how doth it follow that because I can pronounce the word motion
by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body?
Or because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without
any mention of great or small, or any other sensible mode or quality;
that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension,
without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should
be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians
treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities
it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their
demonstrations. But when laying aside the words, they contemplate
the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure
abstracted ideas of extension.
Philonous is saying here that even though we can talk about abstract
mathematical things, or treat abstract quantitites, that we can’t
form ideas of them. But then how do we work with them at all?
Philonous never tells us, but I don’t think I have any ideas either
for math. It seems like math is an especially hard case.
Hyl. But what say you to pure intellect? May not abstracted ideas
be framed by that faculty?
Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain,
I cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect, whatsoever
faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire
into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as
virtue, reason, God, or the like, thus much seems manifest, that
sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented
by the imagination. Figures therefore and extension, being originally
perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect. But for your
further satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure,
abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other
sensible qualities.
Hyl. Let me think a little--I do not find that I can.
Phil. And can you think it possible, that should really exist
in nature, which implies a repugnancy in its conception?
Hylas says that he can’t frame an abstract idea. Philonous concludes
that he shouldn’t believe in them then.
In the second dialogue, on page 56 they talk about abstract ideas
again.
Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to
say to them. But to prevent any further questions, let me tell
you, I at present understand by matter neither substance nor accident,
thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion,
but something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.
Phil. It seems then you include in your present notion of matter,
nothing but the general abstract of idea of entity.
Hyl. Nothing else, save only that I superadd to this general idea
the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas
that I perceive, imagine, or in any wise apprehend.
Here, Hylas is trying to defend his theory of abstract idea by
defining it as the absence of any particular quality.
Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown matter to exist?
Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for if
I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in
the mind, since it is agreed, that place or extension exists only
in the mind: but I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know
not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There
is a negative answer for you: and you must expect no other to
all the questions you put for the future about matter.
Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to
inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you
mean by its existence.
Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives, nor is perceived.
Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of
its existence?
Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive
notion or meaning at all. I tell you again I am not ashamed to
own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its existence, or
how it exists.
Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and
tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of entity
in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and
corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.
Hyl. Hold, let me think a little--I profess, Philonous, I do not
find that I can. At first glance methought I had some dilute and
airy notion of pure entity in abstract; but upon closer attention
it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the
more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but
negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any
positive knowledge or conception of matter, its where, its how,
its entity, or any thing belonging to it.
Phil. When therefore you speak of the existence of matter, you
have not any notion in your mind.
Hyl. None at all.
Hylas tries his best to defend an abstract idea by taking everything
away from an idea. But then he’s left with nothing, and Philonous
really presses him.
They talk about abstract ideas a little bit in the Third Dialogue,
but Philonous doesn’t seem to offer any new arguments against
it.
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