2NihilismIn recent centuries, the term "nihilism" has been used as a synonym for idealism, but also for materialism; for Christianity, but also for atheism; for solipsism, but also for pantheism; and, for good measure, for the likes of pessimism and skepticism. There is no coherent history of its various uses, largely because its users have often been unaware of their predecessors. Turgenev claimed credit for coining the term in 1861, and his claim has been accepted by many; other scholars, however, have determined that he was well over a century too late. I make no attempt to reconstruct the history of how the term "nihilism" has been used, because that history is of negligible importance both for Nietzsche and for philosophy. What makes the term "nihilism" philosophically vital is not its history, but rather its use by Nietzsche. Nihilism becomes philosophically vital when it is presented not as one position among many, a doctrine some may chance to espouse, but rather as the necessary consequence of the Western philosophical tradition. In his own time and for the two centuries to follow, Nietzsche tells us, thoughtful human beings must of necessity be nihilists -- and the thoughtless as well, although they are less likely to know it. What then is this "nihilism" Nietzsche presents as unavoidable? Readers familiar only with works Nietzsche published or prepared for publication might recall no references to it at all. Beyond Good and Evil (1886) is the first published work in which it even appears, and while it is found in most of the later works Nietzsche edited for publication (all save the two on Wagner), it is central to none. Nevertheless, various posthumously published outlines -- some published only within the last twenty years -- reveal that it was to have been a focal point of The Will to Power. Appropriately, the term is prominent in the version of The Will to Power that became standard; that version not only contains various definitions of "nihilism" per se, it also introduces bewilderingly many specific types of nihilism. "Active" and "passive" nihilism are paired, as are "theoretical" and "practical" nihilism, and "complete" and "incomplete" nihilism; other forms appear in relative isolation, including "authentic" nihilism, "contagious" nihilism, "ecstatic" nihilism, the "most extreme" nihilism, "first" nihilism, "final" nihilism, "fundamental" nihilism, "genuine" nihilism, "philosophical" nihilism, "radical" nihilism, "religious" nihilism, "tired" nihilism, and "suicidal" nihilism. Commentators have further complicated matters: Heidegger has added "classical" nihilism as though it were a Nietzschean term, Deleuze "reactive" nihilism, and Rosen the opposition, to which he refers as "Nietzsche's fundamental distinction," between "base" and "noble" nihilism. Nihilism, according to Nietzsche, is our heritage, our fate. If we grant, provisionally, that he may be right about that, then it certainly makes sense to ask: which nihilism? And whichever it is, terminologically, what is it, what does it mean? Is it a blessing, or a curse? Is it a peak we have ascended, or an abyss into which we have plunged? The Will to Power does not answer these questions, for it does not systematically interrelate its various forms of nihilism (nor do the works of Heidegger or Deleuze, or, as far as I know, of other commentators); indeed, the standard version obscures Nietzsche's thought by mangling several important texts. Nevertheless, comprehension of Nietzschean nihilism requires some such interrelation. I here attempt to clarify Nietzsche's notion of nihilism by relating his various forms to three fundamental levels that I, adapting Nietzschean terms, name "religious," "radical," and "complete" nihilism. I suggest that virtually all other forms Nietzsche identifies fall on what I term the level of "radical" nihilism; the distinctions among them are less important, it seems to me, than those among the levels themselves. That this is the case I indicate by introducing some questions my distinction among levels suggests, questions whose answers I take to be of central importance for the comprehension and evaluation of Nietzsche's affirmative teachings. I seek answers for the questions in the following chapters of this book. |
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