PHIL 305(F) Hume and Practical Reason
A distinctive part of Hume's philosophy is his view of reason, and particularly practical reason, as a strictly circumscribed faculty, precisely and narrowly limited in its operations. In opposition to all varieties of philosophical rationalism, Hume held that practical reason can neither move us to action nor dictate our goals; our goals or ends are fixed by our desires, and it is they that move us to act. Reason merely serves to calculate the most efficient means for the achievement of our ends, which are themselves impervious to rational assessment: hence Hume's famous and characteristic pronouncement that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." In this course we shall explore both the intricate details of Hume's own argument about practical reason, at some points influenced by the ideas of his predecessor Francis Hutcheson, and leading modern views on the subject (Bernard Williams, David Wiggins, Thomas Nagel, Stephen Darwall, Christine Korsgaard, Jean Hampton), which are either developments and refinements of Hume or are explicitly presented as an alternative to his position. The main issues discussed will be whether our ends are susceptible to rational assessment, which Hume denied and his critics affirm; whether the Humean view is at least adequate as an account of instrumental rationality; and whether, contrary to Hume's own belief, rational considerations have some independent motivational power. Requirements: class participation and three short papers (5 pages each) on any of the issues discussed, or one short and one longer paper (10 pages); and a class presentation on a relevant topic. Prerequisite: Philosophy 101.