From the very first, Husserl declared phemenology to be a "vision of essences," and he gave to visual perception a privileged role in the pursuit of essential truth. He also valorized the mental glancing by which we see into ourselves as pure consciousness -another mode of vision. Sartre, interpreting such consciousness as consisting in an act of "nihilation," considered the petrifying human "look" (le regard) as the primary vehicle of our being-for-others. It took the special genius of Merleau-Ponty to emphasize the lived body rather than consciousness and to describe this body as a synaesthetic agency that draws on all the senses. Merleau-Ponty also argued for the equiprimordiality of vision and touch as the mainstays of human embodiment. In the wake of phenomenology, Lacan made seeing oneself in the mirror crucial to the formation of the human ego, while Levinas regarded face-to-face vision as integral to our ethical bond with others. Recently, Luce Irigaray revisited the relationship between vision and touch from a radical feminist perspective. This ever-evolving trajectory of thought about vision will be explored in detail in this course, which will also serve as an introduction to phenomenology. We shall begin with a brief account of visual perception in the ancient and early modern world, then proceed to focus on the place of vision in Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and end with the reconsideration of vision to be found in Lacan, Levinas, and Irigaray. Lecture and discussion. Requirements: three short papers. No prerequisites. Enrollment limited to 30.

Hour: CASEY