PHIL 335 Moral Objectivity (Not offered 2006-2007) (W)

We often speak as if moral judgments can be true or false, well-reasoned or not. That is, we speak and think as if morality can be objective. But how should objectivity in this domain be understood? Is it best thought of as being like scientific objectivity, assuming we have a clear sense of what that involves? Or should objectivity in ethics be conceived of differently? While answers to such questions are implicit in historical accounts of morality, these issues have become the topic of explicit, sustained debate in the twentieth century. Our focus will be on the most recent and sophisticated work in this area. We will examine several different approaches in depth, including non-naturalist and naturalist forms of realism, constructivism, and various well-developed forms of anti-realism (both skeptical and non-skeptical). Readings will include works by the following authors: Moore, Stevenson, Harman, Mackie, Railton, Boyd, Blackburn, Williams, McDowell, Korsgaard, and Nagel.
Format: seminar. Requirements: final paper, several shorter assignments, attendance and participation.
Prerequisites: Philosophy 101 required; one 200- or 300-level Philosophy course highly recommended. Enrollment limit: 19 (expected: 5-15). Preference given to Philosophy majors and those considering the Philosophy major.

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